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 The Great Lakes host thousands of shipwrecks. The Lakes are positioned to receive the 
blunt force of two polar fronts during the winter season, this can result in cataclysmic storm 
activity. In 1913, the two fronts combined to create one of the most devastating maritime 
disasters in Great Lakes’ history. Close to 300 people died, with 40 commercial vessels badly 
damaged or sunk, creating the largest fiscal disaster to ever hit the Great Lakes. The storm 
affected all five Great Lakes. This thesis, therefore, looks at the possibility of connecting 
shipwrecks within the archaeological record to the storms that wrecked them. This thesis will 
account for not only wind direction in conjunction with bow heading, but will look at variables 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE WHITE HURRICANE 
 
 Natural disasters may leave recognizable, indelible prints on the maritime archaeological 
record. This thesis will explore the notion that shipwrecks caused by weather events can 
demonstrate, through a careful examination of their wreckage, such data as wind direction, wind 
speed, sea direction, and other disaster conditions. This thesis aims to create an explanatory 
model of the Great Storm of November 1913 by looking at shipwrecks’ bow heading, and then 
comparing them to the storm fronts’ actual movement. The model should, through archaeological 
analysis, connect shipwrecks from the 1913 Storm to the weather system that caused their 
wrecking. Importantly, this thesis will introduce the hypothesis that combining archaeological 
data with the historic recording of weather events may allow researchers to frame predictive 
models to explain not only the site formation process for a known wreck in a known storm, but 
can be used in reverse to explain and identify unknown wrecks given known storms. Simply put, 
can strandings and founderings be used as meteorological vectors to dovetail with historic storm 
accounts and produce identifying data? 
The Great Storm of 1913, which occurred November 7th through the 10th, damaged 
commercial vessels across the Great Lakes with 19 destroyed or sunk. These bulk carriers and 
barges have been documented from a historical perspective, though little archaeology has been 
done to document these wrecked ships (Cooper 1989:92-101). This is an important oversight as 
the inland seas create specific transformation processes that may mask or hide shipwreck 
evidence during a given catastrophic event (O’Shea 2002:211). A century after wrecking, it is 
necessary to look at these wrecked vessels as a case study to understand the long-term effects of 




The November, 1913 Storm devastated the Great Lakes. The storm was the combination 
of two massive weather fronts colliding. A low-pressure cell of cold air, from Canada, pushed 
down while another front rushed east from the American Rockies. This cold front absorbed heat 
as it passed over the Great Plains. Of the two, the one from the Rockies was the most volatile 
front and would eventually combine with the Canadian front to create the Great Storm of 1913. 
The final contributing factor was from the lakes, which were experiencing a particularly warm 
season with the water retaining massive amounts of heat energy. This would prove disastrous 
when the two low pressure systems pushed into the Great Lakes Basin (NOAA 2013b). The 
freakish resultant air mass collision resulted in the deaths of 248 persons, 19 sunken vessels, and 
21 vessels stranded on shore, see FIGURE 1.1 (Barcus 1960:144; Brown 2002:203). This 
cyclone was the most destructive storm to sweep the sweetwater seas in historic times. In 
viewing this event, it can be seen that historic records are biased and only account for large 
company-owned bulk carriers and freighters (Detroit News 1913:1). Unaffiliated sailors 
navigating smaller craft that were caught in the storm have forever been lost to the Lakes’ 
graveyard without a trace in the historical record.  
The Great Storm of 1913 is the perfect candidate to begin to understand the relationship 
between wreck patterns and the ferocity of a particular storm incident. The Great Lakes are large 
enough to create legendary natural catastrophes. When a storm strikes unannounced, there is not 
necessarily a means of avoiding it. The lakes represent the largest bodies of fresh water in the 
world, but lack of sea room in certain areas make riding out a several-days-long storm difficult. 
This establishes the Great Lakes as one of the most proportionally high ship wrecking areas in 
the world. It is estimated that the lakes are the final resting place for anywhere between 10,000 to 




FIGURE 1.1. Map of Total Loss and Stranded Vessels from the 1913 storm, with incorrect 
orientation and wreck position (Brown 2002:203). 
 
 It is the purpose of this thesis to postulate that an understanding of the relationship 
between shipwreck location and storm incidents may allow the possibility of interpreting the 
reason for a shipwreck location when researchers have no other historical records at their 
disposal. From an archaeological and meteorological view, the 1913 Storm has much to offer. 
There have been other Great Lake’s storms that have lived up to the reputation as the “Witch of 
November”; these include: Lake Superior and Lake Huron’s storm of 1905, Lake Erie’s Black 
Friday of October 1916, and Lake Michigan’s Armistice Day blow of November 1940 (Ratigan 
1960:109). These “witches” are formed from the collision of extreme low and high pressure 
systems that create the monstrous storms that periodically hit the Great Lakes. These historical 
storms wreaked havoc on maritime activities and communities, but no storm on the Lakes 
stretched further and caused as much fiscal damage as the Great Storm of 1913 (NOAA 2013a). 
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This thesis has the potential to add to the current process of identifying shipwrecks. A 
data set or a catalogue of recorded storm activity will be needed and must include: dates, wind 
direction and speed, longevity of storm, and affected areas in a bull’s eye pattern from greatest 
effect to least. Contextual placement may eventually allow the construction of a predictive site 
formation model. If abandonment and accidental wrecking events are eliminated, shipwreck 
patterns may correlate with storm fronts while their archeological and geographic positioning 
may make it possible to accurately place unidentified wrecks into the context of the storms that 
destroyed them. This study will have to take into account historical records of wrecks, weather 
fronts, contemporary water currents, archaeological cultural (c-) and non-cultural (n-) 
transforms, and the geographic positioning of wrecks. Cultural transforms are culturally created, 
such as looting, salvaging, purposeful burning, or graffiti. Non-cultural transforms are 
environmental factors; this includes wave action, ice, currents, earthquakes, animal habitation, or 
sediment formation (Schiffer 1987:7).  
In this explanatory model, vessels must be categorized as stranded or foundered; wreck 
type identification is part of the depositional transformation process. Stranded vessels may align 
with the shore, whereas foundered vessels may be affected by lake currents during the 
depositional phase, all of these vessels are affected by storm winds. The wreck of Louisiana, put 
in this theoretical foundation, can help clarify the postulates and details of the hypothesis. This 
wreck was stranded in 1913, everyone survived, it was historically and archaeologically recorded 
in 1989; these factors make it the perfect candidate to be one of the case studies for this thesis. 
Since it was historically recorded and surveyed, this wreck will lend itself to researchers 
attempting to understand the non-cultural and cultural transformations that have occurred since 
its wrecking (Cooper 1989:92-104). If this theory or thesis can be proven through an analysis of 
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Louisiana and other wreck sites from the Great Storm of 1913, it may offer one avenue for ship 
identification to the thousands of wrecked vessels that lay unnamed in the Great Lakes.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  The goal of this thesis is to discover whether it is possible to use shipwrecks as 
positional storm vectors. Provided these storms are historically catalogued, it should be possible 
to trace the shipwrecks back to the storm that caused their demise. As mentioned, there were 19 
ships that were lost in the Storm of 1913 and there were at least 21 more that were stranded. The 
Great Storm of 1913’s weather fronts will be plotted and compared to where the wrecks are now 
positioned using archaeological reports, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), 
Google Earth, and historical accounts. A map must first be made to show the location of each 
known vessel; as yet there is no map that accurately portrays the location of the shipwrecks from 
the Great Storm of 1913. Plotting the shipwrecks to their correct shoreline will be the macro 
study of this thesis and will test the general principle of whether the storm fronts put the 
shipwrecks on the “correct” shoreline according to the wind direction.  
 The bow and stern of each wrecked vessel will be converted to points on a coordinate 
plane and then to a vector. This will indicate the direction of the shipwreck’s bow orientation and 
perhaps the wind direction. This thesis may find “negative weather vanes,” there may be a 
difference between steam and sail powered vessels. Steam propulsion is a different variable 
because a steamship under power may be expected to wreck differently than a sailing ship, 
whose movements are more dependent on the wind and currents. There may also be a difference 
in wooden versus steel steamships, with wooden vessels potentially becoming ineffective during 
a large enough storm. “During heavy seas wooden steamers were often forced to slow or even 
idle their engines ----When needed most they work least------because wooden ships flex so much 
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that the steam machinery could be damaged," Commander Stephen Champlin to Sec. of Navy 
Mason (Rodgers 1996:28).  
The U.S. Weather Bureau recorded the storm's "progress” and wind direction throughout 
the Great Lakes’ cyclone. FIGURE 1.2 shows the two weather systems that created the Great 
Storm of 1913 as recorded by the National Weather Service and as reanalyzed by NOAA 
(NOAA 2013b). The map shows the two low pressure fronts about to meet over the Great Lakes 
Basin. Overlaying weather fronts with a shipwreck’s projected vectors, bow and stern, may show 
whether wreck patterns more closely relate to the storm fronts or if sailors trying to survive the 
storm more drastically influenced wreck positions. Disaster theory speculates that people can 
influence the final resting place of a wreck while in the wrecking process (Gibbs 2006:4 –11). 
SPSS will be used to graph the vessels’ positioning and storm’s movement to test for statistical 
significance and test this theory.  
 




The research for this project will take an archaeological and historical approach; but it 
must also rely on an understanding of how weather fronts work in order to interpret the storm 
data from 1913. It will also encompass retrieving data from each known shipwreck, which as 
mentioned includes coordinates of bow and stern, when possible. This thesis will rely on 
evidence from the physicality of wreck orientation, married with the incident comparison of the 
storm. Statistical analysis is needed to prove or disprove the theory behind catastrophic storms 
having the greatest influence on the wrecking position of a ship. 
Prior to understanding the relationship between storm fronts and wreckages, it is 
necessary to have an understanding of overall loss patterns in the Great Lakes. November is the 
month of storms (Ratigan 1960:109). To fully comprehend the Lakes, this work must dovetail 
the loss patterns in the Great Lakes with known historic weather events and a thorough 
explanation of storm patterns, geography, and temporal patterns. The National Weather Service 
of Detroit’s Retrospective Model of the Great Storm of 1913 will be used to show storm 
direction, wreckages, storm fronts, and water currents. SPSS will provide the statistical 
interpretation of this data. 
It is the contention of this research that the story of the Great Storm of 1913 can be retold 
objectively using retrievable data. This project will rely heavily on newspapers as primary 
resources. Accessible newsprint, directly related to the storm, comes from: Chicago Record-
Herald, Cleveland News, Detroit Free Press, Duluth Herald, and Superior Tribune. Besides 
utilizing newspapers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration curates multiple 
sources cataloguing the weather surrounding this event as well its immediate aftermath (Deedler 
2007). Secondary sources that are utilized are: Brown’s, White Hurricane, Barcus’ Freshwater 
Fury, Marine Review Vol. 43 and Marine Review Vol. 44 (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914; Marine 
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Review Vol. 44 1915; Barcus 1960; Brown 2002). These are impressive sources because of their 
portrayal of the storm through the use of historic accounts married with the accurate movement 
of the storm (Brown 2002:232 –241). These sources include historical newspapers and personal 
accounts that were most adamant about collecting information about the various wrecks across 
the lakes (Barcus 1960:103 –106, 141 –150; Brown 2002:242 –244). 
There are maps that depict the general vicinity of the wrecks from the White Hurricane, 
but there are no maps that accurately portray the location of each wreck. Even Brown’s 2002 
map incorrectly plots Louisiana on the southern side of Washington Island, whereas the vessel 
lies on the northern side of the island; there are a few more incorrectly placed vessels on 
Brown’s map (2002:203). The correct position of Louisiana can be seen in FIGURE 1.3. To 
understand the wrecking patterns of the 1913 shipwrecks, their locations must be accurately 
plotted, including the ship’s orientation to the shore. This encapsulates a macro and micro study 
of the Great Storm of 1913 and its victims. There will be another map symbol that shows the 
general location of shipwrecks with unknown locations; general locations will be ascertained 
from historic records predicting where vessels may have sunk. These map indications will not 
further the thesis but they will help express the scope and presence of the storm event. As these 
wrecks are discovered, their positioning can be used to test the explanatory modeling presented 
by this thesis.  
Louisiana will be the specific case study within the broader study of the 1913 storm. This 
ship is documented in David Cooper’s Survey of Submerged Cultural Resources in Northern 
Door County: 1988 Field Season Report. In this report, the shoreline was left out of the site map 
(Cooper 1989). This detail will be added by retrieving the coordinates of the bow and stern and 
imposing them on an up-to-date Great Storm of 1913 shipwreck map. Drawings of the wreck 
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will accurately show where the bow and stern are relative to the shore; this should give insight 
into how the ship wrecked relative to wind, sea, and current direction compared to Weather 
Bureau data.  
 
FIGURE 1.3 Louisiana Location, Washington Island, Lake Michigan, WI N 45° 23.98’ / W 86° 55.36’ 
(Author/Google Earth) 
 
Louisiana is the first puzzle piece in understanding whether the position of a shipwreck 
can give way to the specifics of a storm incident. One test subject is not enough for an in-depth 
statistical study; therefore, this thesis will utilize various state heritage centers and the state of 
Michigan’s database on Great Lakes shipwreck locations to ascertain exact positioning of other 
wrecks lost in the White Hurricane. To have more test subjects for the SPSS comparison, this 
study will also draw on ships affected by the Great Storm of 1913, but not necessarily destroyed 
by the storm. This means the stories of crew and vessels that maneuvered safely out of the storm 
and vessels left at the dock during the storm will be included in the analysis process. 
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This thesis uses SPSS to find statistical significance. In order to effectively use the tool to 
find that comparison, it is necessary to add other variables, into the equation to see if there are 
other factors that may also be affecting wreck position or detracting from the initial hypothesis, 
which states that wind direction is the biggest factor influencing wreck position. These variables 
will include: light or loaded, length, beam, tonnage, wooden or steel, and sail or steam. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
 Investigating factors influencing the wrecking process has gained popularity since 
Muckelroy (1976) and further with Schiffer (1987). This thesis is dependent on studies focusing 
on site formation processes. O’Shea (2002) has spear-headed the mindset that shore-scattered 
shipwrecks may still add knowledge to the archaeological record; he also pushes for the broad 
regional study of shipwrecks rather than micro studies of individual shipwrecks. One non-
cultural transformation process that is almost universally destructive across the lakes is ice 
shove; this has and will continue to affect shallow shipwreck sites’ orientation (Lenihan 
1987:235, 278). Gibbs pushed this paradigm of macro studies by looking into disaster responses 
of sailors while in the wrecking process as first explained by psychologist Leach, who put 
disaster response in five critical stages which include: pre-impact, impact, recoil, rescue, and 
post-trauma (Leach 1994:24; Gibbs 2006:4 –5).  
Risk response and preparation will be a key aspect when looking at the shipwrecks during 
the Great Storm of 1913; shipwrecks that do not strictly correlate with the storm’s wind patterns 
may have been manipulated by the crew to change the expected natural wrecking pattern, or they 
may have lost power during said storm. Despite captains having decades of experience, many 
still went out in the storm. Thompson’s Graveyard of the Great Lakes offers pivotal information 
concerning the factory mind-set that company officers often demonstrated, often pushing safety 
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limits to make more runs across the lakes (Thompson 2000:331 –368). His work explains why 
captains were willing to venture into gale-like conditions. Souza’s work adds insight to factory 
mind-set behavior because of her explanation of risk management, including economic factors 
that push for more risky behavior (Souza 1998:113 –130). 
 There have been other studies that have looked at how site formation processes have 
occurred alongside storm incidents; these include factors such as: historical storm activity, 
climate patterns, overwash deposits, and sediment features (Mitchell and Thomas 2001:77 –113; 
Kam-bui and Murnane 2004: 13–57). While this does not directly tie into the thesis, it does 
pertain to a better understanding of why a wreck may have moved since the wrecking event, 
keeping in mind that site formation process is occurring and may also naturally transform any 
disaster landscape (Jones 2012:3). Key to this thesis is a thorough understanding of risk 
management and disaster response. Part of this thesis will quantify whether sailors’ actions 
during the November storm had a greater effect on the shipwreck’s final resting place than the 
storm itself (Leach 1994; Souza 1998; Gibbs 2006).  
 A parallel study survey is underway to understand historic storms and shipwrecks off the 
coast of Ireland. This study most closely follows the idea that wrecked ships can give clues to 
their wrecking process. The research is being conducted by the Centre of Maritime Archaeology, 
the School of Environmental Studies, and the University of Ulster Coleraine. This study will 
attempt to take a broad survey of shipwrecks that correlate with historic storms in an attempt to 
measure the power of these storms. The goal is to relate meteorological stations with the 
distressed vessels’ recorded observations of the storm (Forsythe et al 2000:247). 
 If calamitous storms leave an observable archaeological imprint, then an explanatory 
model can be created to aid researchers; it is plausible to conclude that in the future, unidentified 
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shipwrecks caused by storms may be placed in relation to the historic storm that caused the 
wrecking event. By overlaying the Great Storm of 1913’s fronts with shipwrecks’ coordinates 
converted to vectors, there may be insight into correlating the two. This is only possible if a ship 
has not been unpredictably manipulated by the crew in the wrecking event and if cultural and 
non-cultural transforms have not severely altered the disposition of the wreck site. It is also 
possible that human actions or the shoreline have had the final influence on the positioning of a 
wrecked vessel. This thesis will test the hypothesis that shipwrecks caused by catastrophic 
storms in the Great Lakes leave identifiable explanatory wrecking markers that identify the storm 
that caused said wrecking. 
 There are drawbacks to this hypothesis; even if there is a relationship in matching 
historical storms with shipwrecks, there is not necessarily a way to identify the shipwreck if there 
are not comprehensive historical records identifying which ships wrecked in historical storms. 
This hypothesis likely cannot name a ship, it can only add to the overall data of a storm and its 
casualties. Due to the potential inability to name a wreck once it is aligned with a historic storm, 
some may find it unwarranted to pursue this thesis topic, however, adding context to a wreck is 
always insightful into its life history. Once a shipwreck is linked with a storm, researchers may 
go to historical records to identify wrecked ships associated with a historic storm. This has the 
potential to narrow the list of possibilities once a wreck is associated with a storm. Even if never 
identified, compiling information for regional studies would benefit the archaeological record for 
future study. Another drawback could be the randomization of more sudden, localized storms 
that produce tremendous intensity in a given small area. Storms, such as the famous, “White 
Squalls,” have confused the overall weather record in the Great Lakes, as witnessed in the 
sinking of Alvin Clark in 1869 (Van Harpen 2006:81). 
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 Regardless of whether or not this hypothesis is proven, it will add insight into the 
wrecking and site formation processes of wrecks caused by storms on the Great Lakes. It will 
push for a more thorough understanding of pre-wrecking events, and result in the need for either 
non-cultural or cultural transformations processes to be studied more in-depth. This thesis hopes 
to identify a recognizable pattern that allows researchers to match storm-foundered shipwrecks 



























CHAPTER 2: LOSS PATTERNS ON THE GREAT LAKES 
 This thesis attempts to explain the Great Lakes’ intense atmospheric displays and their 
effects on ships wrecked during such cataclysmic demonstrations. To recognize the power of the 
Great Storm of 1913, this chapter will include an overview of general weather patterns during the 
fall to winter months on the inland seas and compare it with the Great Storm of 1913. This 
section relies on information from the National Weather Service of Detroit and National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration resources, created specifically for the Centennial Anniversary 
of the Great Storm of 1913. This chapter will examine wind patterns and wave heights that 
became the “meteorological bomb” that ensued November 7th through 11th, 1913 (Clark et al. 
2013). Also detailed will be the human and financial devastation as indicated by the ships lost. 
“NORMAL” WEATHER TRENDS ON THE LAKES 
 This section will give a background as to why the Great Lakes region becomes volatile 
when polar fronts cross into the area. It will also look to major historic storms as well as their 
monthly placement. This will demonstrate the aggressiveness of the Lakes’ intense weather 
during November and provide the human toll from such weather. 
 The Great Lakes have plagued sailors for centuries with storms; hazardous weather 
comes without warning and easily turns into infamous gales. Unbridled atmospheric displays 
were one of the largest motivating factors for the creation of the National Weather Service, 
which was first proposed in 1869 by Wisconsin Representative Halbert E. Paine (NOAA 2013a).  
 Cold polar fronts colliding with warm air masses are the usual culprits behind severe 
winter storms in the Great Lakes. These opposing air masses consist of contrasting temperatures 
and air densities. Conflicting fronts create instability in the atmosphere. The root of this comes 
from the intensity that is associated with low pressure systems. These system disturbances 
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become winter storms if three conditions are met: cold air, moisture, and lift. Rising moist air 
creates clouds and precipitation; this can lead to fronts (Rank 2009). Storms on the lakes’ areas 
can also lead to lake-effect snow. This type of snow forms because the lakes retain a certain level 
of warmth, even as cold air masses move over the water bodies. The lower level air is heated by 
the lake; the lake’s moisture, now in the air, evaporates into the higher bodies of cold air. This 
rise occurs because warm air is less dense than cold air. As warm air rises, it begins to cool. The 
moisture that was once in the warm air condenses and forms clouds, which in turn trigger 
snowfall (NOAA 2013c). This is illustrated in FIGURE 2.1. Intense snowfall and plummeting 
temperatures are disastrous for mariners on the lakes. Vessels can ice over making them 
exceedingly top heavy and almost impossible to maneuver in hurricane-like conditions.   
 
FIGURE 2.1. Illustration of cold front reacting with warm air to create clouds and precipitation 
(National Earth Science Teachers Association 2012). 
 
 In addition to lake effect, polar fronts come from the mid-Pacific and Arctic; most are 
halted by the Rockies, though a few disturbances cross the mountains. Storm fronts that come 
out of the Colorado Rockies are called “Colorado cyclones”; storm fronts that come out of the 
Canadian Rockies are called “Alberta cyclones” or “Alberta Clippers.” As fronts surge eastward 
they converge over the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes create their own unique weather patterns. 
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The polar fronts that collide in the Great Lakes Basin propel weather to strike and create other 
storms that continue south or east (Rank 2009). These polar fronts contain varied barometric 
pressure which create storm movement as pressure flows from high to low areas. Since the Great 
Lakes retain summer heat, once polar fronts meet warmer waters, weather systems become 
unpredictable.  
 As mentioned, the Great Lakes are subject to unpredictable duress from weather systems. 
TABLE 2.1 lists six infamous storms that hit the Great Lakes. They are listed in chronological 
order and were chosen based on the severity of the storm as indicated by lives lost and ships lost. 
The table also indicates that while Great Lakes’ storms are severe, they do not necessarily affect 
all of the Lakes. The table shows that all of the lakes do get hit by weather fronts and that, while 
rare, multiple lakes can be affected by one or two weather systems simultaneously.   
Storm Date Lake(s) Affected Ships Lost Lives Lost 











Superior, Huron 20 32 
















Michigan 3 66 




Superior 1 29 
TABLE 2.1. Six disastrous storms that have affected the Great Lakes (Mansfield 1899:306-8; 
Ratigan 1960:109; Wolff 1966: 306-308; National Transportation Safety Board 1978:2; LeMay 
2005). 
 
 The storms listed above, with the exception of the “Terrific Storm of 1835,” do not compare 
with the Great Storm of 1913 in terms of duration, fiscal damage, and areas affected with the 




POLAR FRONTS AND THE GREAT STORM OF 1913 
 The Great Storm of 1913 is of particular interest because of its wide reach across the 
Great Lakes. Every lake was affected, with the exception of Lake Ontario, which did not suffer a 
commercial shipping loss. This storm can be classified as a “meteorological monster” (Clark et 
al. 2013), because it fed off two separate low weather systems. The front systems combined and 
continued to intensify over the inland seas because of the waters’ retained summer heat and an 
unusually warm fall (Brown 2002:1).  
On 6 November through 8 November, and originating somewhere in the southern United 
States, a weak pressure system moved east, from the Rockies, to the Atlantic Ocean. Moving 
south from Canada came a low pressure system associated with cold, Arctic air. The Arctic 
system approached the Great Lakes’ Basin on 7 November. In front of the Arctic system were 
strong southwest winds; behind it were strong northwest winds (Clark et al. 2013). The cold 
front reacted violently to the warm lakes. FIGURE 2.2 shows storm 1 and storm 2 as two 
separate fronts. 
Moderate temperatures plunged below freezing as the Arctic front moved into the United 
States. This front moved to the Upper Peninsula of Michigan which immediately began to cause 
storm force winds and high waves on Lake Superior; it is named the “Pre-Storm.” On Saturday 
the 8th, the second low pressure system, originating from the Rockies, continued to develop along 
the Gulf Coast (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:9). 
To complicate this pattern, an unusual strong upper level jet stream ushered in from the 
south; this caused the low pressure system that had been developing in the east to push north. 
The low pressure Arctic system had been weakening over Lake Huron and began to move 
southeast. Winds had died down and waves subsided creating a lull on the lake after a day of 
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storms. In a matter of eight hours from when the jet stream pushed the low pressure Gulf system 
north, the fronts met and created one massive low pressure front system near Washington, DC 
(Wagenmaker et al. 2013:10). The front that had developed on the Atlantic had collected 
excessive amounts of moisture. This intensified the second low pressure front as it traveled 
north. Moisture cannot be sustained in cold air, so after freezing, water vapor came down in the 
form of excessive precipitation. The low pressure southern front became dominant and ushered 
in the deadliest part of the Great Storm of 1913 (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:11). Barometers 
plunged to 29.1 inches Hg as the Great Storm of 1913 became deadly (Clark et al. 2013; 
Wagenmaker et al. 2013:11). FIGURE 2.3 shows the location of the fronts when they combined 
to create the “White Hurricane” (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:11). Severe storms can ensue in the 
coming 12 to 24 hours if barometers rapidly drop from 29.8 inches Hg (Science Company 2014).  
                                                
 
FIGURE 2.2. Locations of low pressure systems before combining, 9 November 1913. Map 





FIGURE 2.3. Merger of storms close to Washington, DC, retrospective model results 
(Wagenmaker et al. 2013:11). 
 
Ships harbored on the western Lake Huron shore since it is generally considered the 
weather shore and presumed safest. When the gale moved and the lows converged, Lake Huron’s 
western shore became one of the deadliest areas of the storm (Barcus 1960:5). Over Lake Erie, 
on 9 November, the central pressure fell to 28.6 inches Hg as the low pressure system moved 
north-northwest. Northwest Minnesota’s barometric pressure was recorded at 30.54 inches Hg. 
The contrasting pressures, combined with their proximity, produced intense storm winds for four 
days; vessels dealt with 90 miles per hour winds and waves pushing 36 feet (Clark et al. 
2013;NOAA 2013a;Wagenmaker et al. 2013:5). The presence of such monstrous waves in the 
Great Lakes is alarming and partially explained by the fact that freshwater is lighter than 
saltwater, allowing freshwater waves to more easily stack up than saltwater waves (Barcus 
1960:5).                                                            
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It took 12 hours for the storm to move out of the Great Lakes area and north of Toronto; 
the storm did not lose any of its power during this time. It was not until Monday morning that the 
storm began to weaken and disappear to the northeast (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:11 –14). 
 In 1913, broadcast systems were still in early development; not surprisingly sparred on by 
the Great Storm of 1913 and the disaster that ensued. Weather Bureau forecasters sent warnings 
to over 100 stations along the shores of the Great Lakes via telegraphs before the weather fronts 
smashed into the Lakes. The warnings were sent out 12 to 24 hours in advance as forecasters 
reacted to dropping barometers. Even though stations were decorated with warnings, many 
sailors were unaware of deteriorating conditions.  Warnings were issued 7 November, but vessels 
that were already out of sight from the shore would be caught in the midst of the storm since ship 
to ship communications were not yet readily available (NOAA 2013a).  
INSIGHT TO THE RETROSPECTIVE NUMERICAL MODEL 
Despite the Weather Bureau’s knowledge of the Great Lakes’ shores, there were little to 
no wind reports for the interior of the lakes; the Bureau was only able to take recordings from 
cities on the southern side of the lakes. Though Lake Huron suffered the worst losses, winds 
were equally as strong on Lake Erie, often sustaining up to 50 to 70 miles per hour while gusts 
reached 85 to 90 miles per hour (Clark et al. 2013; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:16 –28). For the 
Centennial Anniversary of the Great Storm of 1913, the National Weather Service and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2013) created a retrospective numerical model with 
the hope to demonstrate wind speed, wind direction, and wave height. 
 The Great Storm of 1913 is often classified as the “White Hurricane” (Brown 2002:title). 
The National Weather Service of Detroit organized the storm into “Pre-Storm,” and “White 
Hurricane.” The Pre-Storm, out of Canada, halted over Lake Superior and Lake Michigan from 7 
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–8 November. The Great Storm of 1913 became a meteorological monster when the secondary 
front originating from the Gulf combined with the Canadian front from 9 –11 November 
(Wagenmaker et al. 2013:7).  
Radios were not common on commercial vessels during the early 20th century. Ship 
companies did not find it necessary to buy radios for company ships, especially because radio 
stations were not consistently placed throughout the Great Lakes’ shores. Adequate radio 
transmission stations would not be installed into vessels until after World War II (Thompson 
2004:74-6). With no radio system, ship captains had no foresight into the weather systems 
headed their way, nor were they aware of the damage that the Pre-Storm had already caused. 
Numbers may be underreported without real-time radio transmissions, while TABLE 2.2 shows 
recorded White Hurricane losses.  
Storm Date Lake(s) Affected Ships Lost Lives Lost 









TABLE 2.2 Great Storm of 1913 quick statistical reference (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:2). 
 
 The Great Storm of 1913 retrospective numerical weather simulation was the result of a 
NOAA regional collaboration which drew on the expertise of the National Weather Service 
stationed in Detroit. The numerical model’s purpose was to show a contemporary audience what 
sustained wind speeds and wave conditions were like during the Great Storm of 1913. 
Conditions during the storm had not been previously mapped. The simulation was meant to give 
insight into the storm and conditions mariners faced (NOAA 2013b).  
The simulation was difficult to create because polar systems are not predictable and do 
not usually strike the Great Lakes area with such aggression. There is no good comparative 
modern equivalent storm that gave researchers a base to work their model against. This model 
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was difficult to create because the storm occurred 100 years ago, weather forecasters did not 
have comprehensive observations of surface as well as upper air conditions. It was only with the 
advent of more advanced technology that complex mathematical equations, comprising 
atmospheric and oceanic movement of water and air, could be developed for past weather 
systems. Computers have aided meteorologists who are now capable of seeing real time 
calculations of weather patterns (NOAA 2013b).  
 The 20th Century Reanalysis Project provided a comparable state of the atmosphere in 
early November 1913; this gave the presumed initial conditions (NOAA 2013b). These 
conditions were needed before the analysis project could begin because 1913 Great Lakes did not 
have adequate observation and buoy stations that could track atmospheric conditions regularly. 
Much of the information used for the simulation was based on anecdotal evidence; this included 
sustained wind speeds, gusts, and wave heights. This simulation was created 100 years after the 
storm event occurred, leaving room for some error (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:5). 
 Researchers utilized the Weather Research and Forecast (WRF) model in order to predict 
the hourly forecasts of: mean sea level, pressure in millibars, sustained wind speeds at the 
surface in knots, wind gusts at the surface in knots, and three-dimensional equivalents of the 
potential temperatures. This aided in recreating the atmospheric conditions. The model drew 
from NOAA Great Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory, which used the Donelan Wave 
Model (GDM) to simulate the approximations for significant wave heights, dominant wave 
period, and the wind and wave directions. The significant wave height was recorded using the 
average height of the highest 33rd percentile. There was also a comparison of peak wave heights; 
this was calculated using the average of the highest fifth percentile from wave energy 
distribution. Highest achievable wave heights were predicted for the “worst case scenarios” that 
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bulk carriers may have dealt with during the Great Storm of 1913 (NOAA 2013b; Wagenmaker 
et al. 2013:6). 
 In order to calculate “significant waves,” the computer simulation measured the mean of 
computer-generated waves. If the mean of waves had a positive skew, the significant waves 
would average as the largest one-third (33%) and the maximum waves would average as the 
highest one-twentieth section (5%). This model is acceptable because waves are not consistent. 
There was great anticipation for the computer wave simulation because prior to the creation of 
the model, the only record of mid-lake waves came from the few survivors of the storm. 
Anecdotal observations put waves as high as 35 feet on Lake Huron and Lake Superior during 
the climax of the storm, this agrees with the retrospective model (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:29 – 
30). 
CHASING THE WHITE HURRICANE OF 1913 
 November can be warm or cold on the Great Lakes. The water retains summer warmth, 
while receiving polar fronts from the Arctic and mid-Pacific. The Pre-Storm of 1913 occurred 
when an uncharacteristically warm Great Lakes Basin encountered an Arctic low pressure 
system. Warning flags were signaled as early as 10:00 am on Friday, 7 November on Lake 
Superior when the low pressure system was discovered. The United States Weather Bureau 
telegraphed a storm warning to all of the stations on the Great Lakes, 
HOIST SOUTHWEST STORM WARNINGS TEN A.M…. STORM OVER 
UPPER MISSISSIPPI VALLEY MOVING NORTHEAST….BRISK TO HIGH 
SOUTHWEST WINDS THIS AFTERNOON AND TONIGHT SHIFTING TO 
NORTHWEST SATURDAY ON UPPER LAKES….WARNINGS ORDERED 
THROUGHOUT THE GREAT LAKES…. (Barcus 1960:2). 
 
Unfortunately, the warnings went unheeded by many captains; the United States Weather Bureau 
was in its infancy and their predictions were often considered inaccurate.  
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Generally on the Great Lakes, the shipping season ends when the lakes freeze over. By 
November, Great Lakes’ captains knew their runs across the lakes were limited, so many 
ventured into the lakes knowing that it would be one last chance to make money for their 
companies and a storm was arriving within a matter of hours. White Hurricane mariners did not 
recognize the severity of the storm that lay ahead, especially because most storm warnings had 
an expiration of 24 hours. This low pressure system was so powerful that by evening, storm 
winds hit the lakes. The persistence of the storm made the United States Weather Bureau send 
out another storm warning by 10 am Saturday. The life of the storm would theoretically extend at 
least another 24 hours (Barcus 1960:2-3; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:8). 
 Within 24 hours of detection, the low pressure system moved across the Upper Peninsula 
of Michigan. Lake Superior and Lake Michigan were hit with intense storm weather; this 
included gale winds and high waves that quickly affected vessels on Superior and Michigan 
(Cooper 1989:93;Wagenmaker et al. 2013:9). TABLE 2.3 shows some of the early victims of the 
storm. The locations for vessels stranded during the morning of 8 November, 1913, are not 
specifically given here for the sake of brevity. Foundered and stranded shipwreck locations will 
be looked at, in depth, in Chapter 4. 
Date Estimated 
Time 













Stranded 0 Various 
Locations 
TABLE 2.3 Indication of first vessel lost during Great Storm of 1913 (Cooper 1989:93) and 
indication of ships driven ashore on Lake Superior by the morning of November 8, 1913 




Saturday, 8 November, ushered in the low pressure front that had developed along the 
Gulf Coast. This front was directly south of the Arctic front. Wind and waves increased; lake 
water transformed to sheets of ice halting the progress of sailors seeking shelter. Mariners that 
had neglected the warnings or who were already on the sweetwater seas by the time warnings 
were posted were increasingly likely to be trapped between storm and shoreline (Barcus 1960:3-
4; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:9). FIGURE 2.4 shows the retrospective model of the two storms 
merged that would soon wreak havoc on the mariners out on the Lakes. 
 
FIGURE 2.4. 8 pm Sunday; 9 November, 1913. Two storm fronts merged and moving in on the 
Great Lakes (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:12). 
 
Part of the danger associated with working on the Great Lakes was the push to make as 
many runs across the lakes before winter iced over transportation routes. Many ports scheduled 
last runs to be in November. Historically, this month was the most dangerous month to voyage 
across the Great Lakes due to unexpected storms (Thompson 2004: 99, 272). This was a 
dangerous mentality as it pushed captains to make poor decisions while on the lakes; it made 
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many gamble unfairly with the lives of their crew when the weather was debatable (Hemming 
1992:9-10).  
 The 1913 gamble for Lake captains began when the first low pressure system began to 
weaken. The Alberta cyclone had been powerful over Lake Superior, but once it went over Lake 
Huron, the storm deceptively eased (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:10). This pause in storm power 
falsely assured some captains that the Lakes were calm and the storm was in the process of 
blowing itself out. Saturday, 8 November at 10:00 pm, waves on Lake Huron averaged 6 feet in 
height; maximum wave height was 8 feet. It did not take long for waves to dramatically increase 
(Wagenmaker et al. 2013:30). 
By 8 am, Sunday, 9 November, the two separate storms combined to form one massive 
storm; this storm merger can be seen in FIGURE 2.5 (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:10 –16). The low 
pressure system passed over Erie, Pennsylvania and was recorded at 28.61 inches Hg (969 
millibars). The storm plowed north and settled in the upper Great Lake, when the fronts 
combined. The winds associated with the merged storms increased. The winds on the upper lakes 
were 25 knots (28.8 mph) and gusts were up to 40 knots (46 mph). Lake Huron and Lake Erie’s 
weather conditions severely worsened as the White Hurricane increased its intensity (PC 
Weather Products 2004; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:12, 16). 
 Lake Michigan and Lake Huron dealt with increasing winds as the low moved into 
Pennsylvania at 1 pm Sunday, 9 November. Gusts raged to 45 –50 knots (51.2 –57.5 miles per 
hour). By late afternoon, the low moved northwest towards the lakes. Waves on Lake Superior 
began diminishing by 10 am, however, Lake Huron experienced a rise in average waves, up to 
12 feet. The pressure continued to decrease. Quick drops make winds stronger and colder. 
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Vessels were in the lakes at this point; some had entered the lakes thinking the danger was over 
as the pre-storm ebbed in power (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:12 –18). 
 
FIGURE 2.5. 8 am Sunday, 9 November 1913; systems merge. Image shows Lakes (green) in 
conjunction with the low pressure system (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:16). 
 
Many vessels on Lakes Superior, Michigan, and Huron were down-bound towards the St. 
Clair River; other up-bound vessels tried to pass Port Huron on Lake Huron. As time increased, 
so did the storm’s power. The storm crossed Pennsylvania and headed towards eastern Lake Erie. 
By 4:40 pm on Sunday, gusts close to Cleveland peaked at 62 knots (71.3 mph), and wave height 
increased (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:17 – 18, 31 – 32). TABLE 2.4 shows two more vessels lost 
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on the lakes around six in the evening on 9 November. FIGURE 2.10, on page 36, shows cities, 
rivers, and lake locations for vessels affected during the Great Storm of 1913. 
Date Estimated 
Time 









6 pm Superior Henry B. 
Smith 
Sank 23 Marquette, 
MI 
TABLE 2.4 Briefing of the loss of Henry B. Smith, Argus and crew (Hemming 1992:45; Brown 
2002:203; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:32). 
 
Sunday evening, just three hours past the simulation’s last results, winds increased to 65 
– 70 knots (74.8 – 80.6 mph) in Georgian Bay. Winds amplified over Lake Erie and Lake Huron, 
indicated in FIGURE 2.6. The low pressure system was located between Buffalo and Erie; it 
slowly moved northwest. Storm winds branched over Lake Superior, Michigan, Huron, and Erie; 
the winds brought heavy snows that affected vessels on the lakes as well as cities along the 
lakes’ front.  
  




In two hours, Lake Huron’s simulated waves increased to a maximum height of 24 feet. 
The simulation calculated waves occurring every 10 seconds with significant waves occurring 
every 50 seconds, and maximum waves occurring every 200 seconds. The upper lake area had 
colder air, so stronger lake effect snow squalls hit the area; lake conditions for mariners 
deteriorated as the day progressed. (Cleveland Plain Dealer 1913:1; Wagenmaker et al.  
2013:19, 33). 
 Lake Huron’s weather conditions worsened; by 8 pm, winds exceeded 70 knots and 
maximum waves occurred every three minutes and 20 seconds. Waves were estimated at 28 feet 
in height (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:34). The National Weather Service and NOAA (2013) placed 
the center of the low between Erie and Buffalo, with a low of 28.76 inches Hg(974 millibars). 
See TABLE 2.5 for vessels affected on 9 November. 
Date Estimated 
Time 





8-10 pm Huron Howard 
Hanna Jr. 




8-10 pm Huron John 
McGean 








Foundered 28 Alpena, MI 
November 
9th 
8-10 pm Huron H.P. 
Hawgood 




8-10 pm Huron Hydrus Foundered 25 Goderich, 
Ontario 
TABLE 2.5 Vessels and crew affected from 8-10 pm on 9 November (Brown 2002:203 –204; 
Wagenmaker et al. 2013:34). 
 
Detroit measured winds as high as 52 knots (60 mph) and Port Huron measured as high 
as 58 knots (67 mph) by 8 pm. Sunday night, 9 November continued to worsen; by 10 pm, gale 
winds covered all of Lake Huron. Winds were projected between 69 – 78 knots (80 – 90 mph), 
see TABLE 2.6. At the height of the storm many vessels would be lost to the lake within hours 





Lake Vessel Occurrence Lives Lost Location 
November 
9th 
11 pm Huron Charles S. 
Price 








11 pm Huron P.O. Mills Stranded 0 Harbor 
Beach, MI 
TABLE 2.6. Vessels and crew affected around 11 pm on 9 November (Brown 2002:203; 
Wagenmaker et al. 2013:35). 
 
By 10 pm, waves reached a maximum height of 32 feet. It was nearly impossible to 
navigate the inland seas; waves crashed over smaller boats and capsized vessels as large as 500 
feet. Heightened waves were a huge hazard to mariners (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:35). FIGURE 
2.7 illustrates the ferocity of the storm inland. 
 
FIGURE 2.7. E. 105th St., Cleveland, Ohio, Nov. 11, 1913 (Cleveland Plain Dealer 1913:1). 
 Monday morning, 10 November, did not ease mariners’ troubles; London, Ontario 
received the new low pressure system by 1 am. This made winds over Lake Erie begin to move 
westerly; in turn, winds increased close to Buffalo. Waves reached 36 feet near Port Austin, 
Michigan. At this point, gusts over Lake Superior and Lake Michigan reached 70+ knots (80+ 
mph). The computer simulation makes the low pressure system halt over southwest Ontario 
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around 4 am. This is the first time winds begin to decrease over Lake Huron. Lake Huron was 
subject to 10 consecutive hours of gusts qualifying as hurricane winds from 6 pm on Sunday, 9 
November to 4 am, Monday, 10 November. Hurricane winds were widespread over the eastern 
part of Lake Superior and the northern part of Lake Michigan. Central Lake Superior received 
gusts matching 70+ knots (80+ mph) by 7 am, the low still over southwest Ontario. The most 
powerful winds breached Superior and Michigan at this time. The Captain of Harvester, 
estimated gusts as high as 87 knots (100 mph) by 4:30 am just west of Michipicaten Island, Lake 
Superior (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:21 – 23, 36 – 37). See TABLE 2.7 for vessels affected on the 
morning of 10 November. 
Date Estimated 
Time 
Lake Vessel Occurrence Lives Lost Location 
November 
10th 




12 am Huron James 
Carruthers 




12:30 am Huron Motoa Stranded 0 Point Aux 
Barques, MI 
TABLE 2.7. Vessels and crew affected by storm after midnight on 10 November (Brown 2002:203 
–204; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:36). 
 
 Lake Superior received 36 foot maximum waves along Pictured Rocks National 
Lakeshore by 6 am on of 10 November. Within the hour, winds over southern Lake Huron 
decreased slightly allowing experienced captains more maneuverability against crashing waves 
and storm force winds. The computer simulation projected waves as high as 38 feet east of 
Munising Harbor around 8 am; Sylvania reported massive waves near Whitefish Point over Lake 
Superior at 10 am. Simultaneously, waves increased to 22 feet in the eastern basin pushing 




Hurricane force winds pushed forward on the eastern side of Lake Erie. Winds were 
blowing southwesterly; maximum waves were estimated to be 24 feet. Lightship 82 was lost 
close to Buffalo (United States Coast Guard 2014).  
While the time is unknown, it is estimated it was lost close to midday, Monday, 10 
November. Toledo’s harbor water levels were 6 feet below normal; it is presumed that high 
winds pushed surging waters into Buffalo Harbor. Lake Michigan experienced a break in high 
winds after 13 hours of hurricane force gusts. Eastern Lake Erie still experienced hurricane 
gusts; Buffalo recorded experiencing winds as high as 70 knots (80 mph) around 2 pm. Winds 
finally began to subside close to noon on 10 November, though maximum waves still pushed 32 
feet close to Marquette and Munising (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:24 – 27, 40). See TABLE 2.8 for 
the vessel lost midday on 10 November. 
Date Estimated 
Time 
Lake Vessel Occurrence Lives Lost Location 
November 
10th 
Midday Erie Lightship 
82 
Lost 6 Buffalo, 
NY 
TABLE 2.8 Vessel and crew affected on 10 November, 1913 close to Buffalo Harbor (Brown 
2002:203 –204; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:40). 
 
 Southwest Ontario dealt with the low pressure system for 16 hours. By four in the 
afternoon, Monday, 10 November, hurricane gusts on Lake Superior began to decrease, though 
they were still considered storm force winds. That evening, around 7 pm, the computer 
simulation indicates that the low pressure system began to move to the northeast across Ontario. 
The low pressure system was decreasing in power though storm gusts were still evident across 
Lakes Superior, Michigan, Erie, and Ontario; this can be seen in FIGURE 2.8. It was not until 
midnight, 11 November that the White Hurricane weakened its hold over the Great Lakes; it took 
four days for the storm to move into the northeast, near Quebec and disappear (Wagenmaker et 





FIGURE 2.8. 11 November; storm dissipating (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:27). 
 
The storm barely moved for 12 hours on Sunday night while still influencing wind and 
waves. By Monday morning, the storm’s center was north of Toronto; the pressure was 28.79 
inches Hg (975 millibars). The simulation’s storm pressures are predicted to be fairly accurate; 
the computer placed the storm just west of the actual location and gave the storm’s pressure 
28.70 inches Hg (972 millibars). The storm did not move east until Monday evening; this made 
the storm weaken over the Toronto area. FIGURE 2.9 shows the front losing power and 
dissipating Monday evening. The simulation is surprisingly accurate compared to actual 
observations. Lack of atmospheric measuring technology meant that no upper atmospheric 
conditions could be gauged, including what the upper atmospheric high and low pressures were 




FIGURE 2.9. Monday, 7 pm, storm weakens and moves north (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:26). 
 
The main front hit the lakes from the southeast on Sunday, 9 November. This resulted in 
hurricane winds and recurrent gusts over 80 miles per hour. Hurricane force is greater than 74 
miles per hour (National Weather Service and NOAA 2013); the numerical simulation projected 
winds that were sustained hurricane force for hours at a time; Huron – 10 hours; Superior – 20 
hours; Michigan – 13 hours; Erie – 16 hours. The computer simulation, combined with anecdotal 
evidence, attributes Lake Huron with wind gusts over 90 miles per hour on the evening of 9 
November. That night, from 6 pm to midnight, a total of nine vessels and more than 200 people 
were lost in the storm. Southern Lake Huron experienced wind speeds from 45 knots to over 70 
knots in a matter of hours (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:28, 37). 
 Waves of intimidating height accompanied hurricane winds across the Great Lakes. 
Survivors of the storm told of waves as high as 36 feet; these anecdotal waves were confirmed 
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by the computer simulation as well as by wave theory (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:43). These huge 
waves drastically affected bulk carriers crossing the lakes. The larger the random wave, the more 
likely the breakpoint is farther offshore (Thornton and Guza 1983:5925). Researchers predict 
waves doubled in height on 9 November starting in the afternoon and increasing until evening. 
The space directly northwest of Michigan’s eastern “thumb,” the mouth of Saginaw Bay, 
Michigan, was riddled with large waves. Waves become larger when a lake is orientated in the 
direction of the wind since the wind has more fetch. Lake Huron runs north to south; with proper 
wind conditions, the waves reached as high as 36 feet, and with a return frequency of less than 
three and a half minutes. Significant waves occurred in intervals of 10 seconds (Wagenmaker et 
al. 2013:43).  
The Great Lakes are not forgiving to storm-caught vessels. Rogue waves may occur in 
the middle of the Lakes, but captain and crew must also be wary close to shore as they must 
contend with shoals and bluffs. As the Great Lakes are inland seas; mariners have little sea room 
and nowhere to outrun a storm when one strikes. 
Chapter 2 gave a quick comparison of gales on the Great Lakes and the Great Storm of 
1913 as well as an overview of the storm’s progression. This chapter introduced the destruction 
of the weather event in terms of people and vessels lost while compared to the wind forces and 
wave heights (Clark et al. 2013). Chapter 3 will set the theoretical bases for this thesis which 
postulates that wind direction and shipwrecked bow direction are related; the chapter looks at 




FIGURE 2.10. Cities, Lakes, Rivers of the Great Lakes Basin (Google Earth)
CHAPTER 3: GROUNDING WEATHER AND VESSELS IN THEORY 
 This thesis will rely on three theoretical approaches to supply the groundwork to the 
Great Storm of 1913 shipwreck-orientation explanatory model. This maritime disaster featured 
the convergence of two low pressure systems that resulted in the loss of hundreds of people and 
affected dozens of vessels. Yet despite sustained hurricane force winds, the affected vessels do 
not lie in perfect orientation with the historic storm winds. Therefore, this thesis has to discern 
how the crew, desperate for survival, overcame the predicted environmental transformations that 
affected the vessels during the initial wrecking event. To comprehend variables affecting the 
vessels, this thesis will explore the cultural transformations of risk management, disaster 
response, pre, and post depositional processes. Thompson states, “You don’t have to study many 
wrecks before you’re likely to notice some distinct patterns emerging….They include the size of 
the fleet operating….the level of technological development, the status of government regulation, 
and the attitudes and behaviors of those within the industry –the human factor” (Thompson 
2000:9). There are variables that must be examined to help explain wrecking patterns. 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
 This section looks at how corporations, government, and society view and assess risks. It 
is necessary to understand why mariners venture onto the lakes during stormy conditions before 
beginning to calculate an explanatory model for shipwreck orientation. As described, captains 
and crews generally work on the Great Lakes until the Lakes freeze over. General bad weather 
and cataclysmic squalls during the transitional months contribute to a seasonal bias of ships 
wrecked during the stormy months from fall to winter (Forsythe 2000:248). This section will 
look at risk assessment to explain why crew members, captains, and companies were willing to 
risk everything for one last run across the lakes before the shipping season ended. Risk is defined 
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as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by 
modernity itself” (Beck 1992:21). In this context, modernity is analogous to 20th century 
American capitalism. Mariners often risk their safety for what may amount to one extra day of 
work (Thompson 2004:100). 
 Government allows risky behavior because without taking necessary risks, societies do 
not expand. Corporate groups, which take on a state-like presence, as well as government 
agencies must communicate with the public, and often turn risky behaviors into ritualized 
accepted behaviors for the sake of profit margins. There are acceptable and unacceptable risks in 
terms of jobs as well as how many people are affected by a risk (Crook 1999:170,173). Risk in 
American society becomes accepted when there is chance for financial gain. Risks are culturally 
and socially constructed, and perceptions of risk are created to maintain a certain way of life 
(Souza 1998:113-4). Mariners during the Great Storm of 1913 accepted risks when they went out 
into the November gale. They assessed their seamanship with the financial incentive to work 
longer. 
Risk taking is part of Great Lakes shipping culture. Outdated equipment on vessels are 
not uncommon and even new vessels can easily fall victim to a powerful storm, despite the Coast 
Guard’s best effort to ensure vessel safety (Thompson 2004:368). Each time a ship leaves port, 
crew and company are betting on returning safely home with monetary rewards for their work. 
Crews bet against the chances of being lost at sea, a fate that would bring potential financial ruin 
to the owners, and devastation to the family of the crew (Souza 1998:113).  
 Shipping has high risks, but general good weather and high financial gain can overrule 
safe behavior. Risky behavior may be overlooked because it can be viewed as calculable and 
therefore, mariners can reason themselves into believing they are safe (Edwald 1991:202). With 
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the right amount of luck, a captain may be fortunate with weather, crew competency, and fitness 
of vessel. Luck in multiple shipping events may contribute to overconfidence which may push a 
risk-taking captain and crew into a storm for which they are unprepared (Thompson 2004:353). 
There was a clear economic incentive to ship since people were being paid to ship cargo from 
Point A to Point B by the quickest route possible. 
 High risks tend to be measured on an individual scale, however, mariners are a sub-
population of high risk individuals (Dean 1999:139). Individuals can be tricked into a false sense 
of security when high risk-experiences turn out favorably for them, or if risks seem minimal for 
the activity. A constant, favorable outcome can lower an individual’s estimate of the actual 
amount of risk involved in an activity by adding bias to the decision making process, even if the 
individual once counted an activity as risky behavior (Souza 1998:115). This mentality can be 
seen when experienced sailors venture into storm-state waters, or when outdated vessels are still 
pushed for runs past their safe-use date. FIGURE 3.1 shows a captain taking risks in high-seas 
without a safety rope. 
 
FIGURE 3.1. Captain Rob Munday on board unknown vessel in the mid-1940s (Walker 2013). 
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 Outdated vessels may fall into the “one more voyage hypothesis” (Murphy 1983:75). 
This means that the ship was used for “one more voyage” past its safe-use limit. The reason for 
using vessels longer than their safe-use limit is because the longer a ship is used to work, the 
greater the economic return on the initial investment (Souza 1998:129). Even if a vessel can no 
longer be insured in a cost and benefit analysis, it was often historically more cost-effective to 
use the ship until it broke down past possible repair status than prematurely abandon the vessel 
and upgrade to a faster, more efficient ship. By 1913, metal ships were gaining popularity on the 
Lakes. Regardless of metal ships being popular, they were not the only vessels on the lakes; there 
were still many wooden vessels, such as Louisiana and Halstead (University of Wisconsin Sea 
Grant and Wisconsin Historical Society 2003). Wooden vessels were not structurally prepared 
for hurricane winds; these were hard conditions even for the most up-to-date vessels (National 
Marine Sanctuaries and NOAA 2013). This is especially true for wooden vessels with steam 
propulsion, as the hull worked, or distorted, it may move more than an engine’s tolerance, 
essentially leaving a vessel dead in the water (Royal Institution of Naval Architects 1860:65; 
Elliot Bay Steam Launch Co. 2002; Wooden Boat Forum 2002).  
 Great Lakes captains and crew know that they have a job that can become dangerous 
quickly. People bordering the Great Lakes have seen weather change rapidly once winter is 
close. Yet, even in the midst of a storm, not all sailors refuse to work. Crews had to trust the 
command of the captain and captains were put under enormous stress to make multiple runs 
across the Lakes before they froze (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:433; Thompson 2000:331 –
368). There are typical characteristics associated with individuals in high-risk occupations. Such 
characteristics include: self-recruitment, strong traditions, and socially established norms of risk 
acceptance and risk behavior (Hovden 1987:54). Unfortunately, this can lead to a fatalistic 
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attitude (Souza 1998:114). This attitude, and competition with other shipping companies, creates 
a push to make more runs across the Lakes than previous seasons. If mariners refuse work when 
there is a hint of storm weather, cargo would not reach its destination port on time. This would 
severely alter the livelihoods dependent on the movement of cargoes. Crews and captains felt 
compelled to push themselves on the Lakes in order to keep their jobs and had to adapt their 
mentality of how they viewed risk (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:433). 
DISASTER RESPONSE 
 This section looks at how people respond to disasters and how that may affect the 
outcome of shipwreck orientation. Part of the explanation encompasses the randomness that is 
associated with predictable responses from people under catastrophic stress. Non-cultural 
transformation processes have been studied in depth (Muckelroy 1976; Stewart 1999; Ward 
1999; Wheeler 2002). N-transforms are quantifiable and the scientific method may be applied to 
them. Human behaviors are hard to measure; human responses in disaster scenarios do not 
follow a specific, quantifiable equation, especially with the different variables of a wrecking.  
 To grasp the processes that form the archaeological record, Muckelroy presented a flow 
diagram to show how organized artifact assemblages transform to the clusters of seemingly 
disorganized artifacts that are witnessed on archaeological sites, seen in FIGURE 3.2. Further, 
there have been studies that have begun to investigate behavior responses; this would come 
before “The Process of Wrecking” in Muckelroy’s model. Looking at human behaviors rather 
than solely environmental processes that affect a wrecked vessel offers a dynamic approach that 
creates “operational models reflecting the progress of a disaster” (Leach 1994:6). Through the 
process of evaluating human behaviors in disaster scenarios, a disaster response framework has 




FIGURE 3.2. Muckelroy’s 1976 Transformation Flow Diagram (Muckelroy 1976:282). 
Disaster response is presented within the depiction of the ship that begins the flow 
diagram. If actions are significantly appropriate during the pre-wrecking process, it is possible to 
avoid the wreck entirely. Archaeologists must look further into the pre-wreck nature of a ship, its 
crew, and its contents; Muckelroy suggests that it would benefit archaeologists to begin looking 
at shipwreck sites with a consistent framework. This would aid a more scientific approach while 
trying to understand human behaviors (Gibbs 2002:1). 
 It is commonly perceived that there are two categories of shipwrecks: catastrophic and 
intentionally abandoned. Catastrophic wrecks are unintentional, be it through structural defects, 
explosions, founderings, strandings, or collisions. Leach’s 1994 work represents the disaster and 
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response framework; it applies to catastrophic shipwrecks. Gibbs first recognized and used 
Leach’s framework which applied to maritime disaster framework,  
1.) Pre-Impact Stage – The period before the disaster event. 
a. Threat Phase – When the possibility of the disaster is identified. 
b. Warning Phase – When the disaster is imminent. 
2.) Impact Stage – During the disaster event and immediately afterwards. 
3.) Recoil Stage – Commencing when the immediate threat to life has receded. 
4.) Rescue Stage – When the person or group is removed from danger. 
5.) Post-trauma Stage – Medium to long-term responses to the disaster (Gibbs 2006:4 –5). 
Gibbs recognized that simultaneous to these disaster responses, there are environmental forces 
acting independently on the physical structure and contents of a vessel, plus cultural remains. 
Environmental factors are independent; the crew responds to environmental factors, though not 
always in a well thought-out fashion.  
 The pre-impact stage includes the training of the crew, which is comprised of the 
experience of the captain and crew as well as how much safety training had been practiced prior 
to the threat phase. In terms of the Great Storm of 1913, the pre-impact phase can include 
whether captains opted to go out in the storm, if they chose to dock their vessel at port, if they 
tried to outrun the storm until they got to an area that they assumed was a safe zone, or if they 
headed into the storm. Great Lakes’ captains and crews know that November is a month of 
storms, referring to it as “the curse of the eleventh month” (Thompson 2000:207). Also key to 
the pre-impact stage is how the vessel was constructed and maintained, as well as the route used, 
equipment, stowage, type and density of cargo, hull material, propulsion type, and repairs of the 
vessel (Gibbs 2006:5). 
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 The threat phrase begins when there is a physical threat. Once a hazard is recognized, the 
threat phase includes the short term aspect of people responding to the threat. Response actions 
are varied and include: complete failure to act on the hazard, acting in an appropriate manner, 
acting appropriately but unable to mitigate the threat, or not acting appropriately to the threat. It 
is possible to fail to recognize the threat as a true hazard, which in turn would encourage 
someone to misjudge suitable actions to take in response to the threat (Gibbs 2006:7-8). Gusts 
reaching 90 miles per hour are a high intensity risk factor, as vessels fought for hours before 
foundering. This includes the dynamics of a vessel under steam or sail. Experienced steam 
captains would head into the storm, presenting the reinforced bow to the waves in order to 
protect their hull from taking the brunt of waves. Heading into the waves also keeps the ship 
from being blown onto a lee shore or reef (Boatsafe 2009;Pascoe 2014). 
 The impact phase, after the hazard is considered imminent, may last seconds to hours 
depending on the conditions of the catastrophe (Leach 1994:25). The way a ship wrecks may be 
dependent on the crew reacting to a threat, environmental factors, or both. The wreck may be 
considered a reflection of the moments before the wrecking event. These actions may include 
heading a vessel into the wind or stranding a vessel on a nearby shore. It is possible, potentially 
for a steam powered vessel like Wexford, to lose engine power and then lose their footing in a 
storm. Wexford acts as an outlier for the explanatory model because despite being a steam 
powered vessel, it foundered on the lee side of the lake, opposite of the other steam powered 
vessels on Lake Huron (Carroll 2010:190). This may be because the vessel lost power and the 
captain was unable to head the vessel into the storm. Human actions prior to the wrecking and 




 Many vessels in the Great Storm of 1913 were refloated after being stranded (Marine 
Review Vol. 44 1915:41 –44). Some of these vessels have historical records pinpointing the area 
that they were wrecked, but the exact bow and stern positioning prior to being removed from 
their stranded position is not known and, therefore, will not apply to this study for the sake of the 
explanatory model. Refloated vessels may be included in maps showing the effects of the White 
Hurricane without confusing explanatory maps as long as it is indicated in the map. 
FORMATION AND DEPOSITIONAL THEORY 
 This section looks at the archaeological shipwreck site as a dynamic process. Vessels are 
affected by their environment. This may limit the amount of information attainable for an 
explanatory model and may make it impossible to create a predictive model. Since 
transformation processes may be detrimental to shipwrecks, it is necessary to create a systematic 
and methodological framework for surveys and excavations when examining wreck sites so that 
transferable observations may be applied to less detailed wreck sites.  
The shoreline is riddled with wave activity; the hydrodynamic environment may change 
often between local climate patterns and intense storms surrounding vessels, this results in 
variable deterioration. Storms may be severely destructive to an archaeological site; multiple 
storms could leave a site permanently changed (Przywolnik 2002:150).  
 Maritime archaeologists must grasp formation theory because it deals with two major 
problems that have the potential to confuse researchers. Depositional theory looks at how 
materials pass from one systematic context to an archaeological site; what once was an on-going 
behavioral system transforms to a static behavioral process. Post-depositional and recovery 
processes look at what happens to the materials in the archaeological site as well as their spatial 
interrelationships between time and where they are deposited and when they are recovered. The 
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process of discovery and recovery is not inherently perfect and can severely bias the 
archaeological record; this has the potential to skew the perception of the archaeologist (O’Shea 
2002:212).  
 Prior to the depositional phase of a shipwreck, the crew, the vessel, and all of its contents 
operate within the same ongoing systematic context (Souza 1998:47 –48;O’Shea 2002:212). The 
pre-wrecking event entails the efforts of the crew to survive which may drastically over 
compensate storm forces. This can be seen when ships head into storm forces, or conversely 
when they lose power during the storm. Mariners struggling against the Great Storm of 1913 
faced hurricane-force winds; their efforts during the storm may be reflected by vessels pointing 
into the wind if the sea anchors were used or if powered vessels headed into the storm. 
 Vessels that run aground may break apart and leave archaeologists to piece them back 
together in their original construction. These vessels may be more drastically affected by ice 
shove on a yearly basis and salvage efforts, which would alter their original orientation to shore. 
Other vessels may turn turtle and permanently capsize. This changes how the vessel sinks as it is 
possible that the capsized vessel will float several hours or days before sinking (Carroll 
2010:145). This study encompasses some capsized vessels. Charles S. Price was the mystery 
ship that floated bottom up after the storm. The vessel did not sink for a few days and it was not 
until a diver went down to physically identify the ship that its true identity was known (Port 
Huron Times-Herald 1913:1). Isaac M. Scott and Regina also capsized (National Marine 





FIGURE 3.3. Charles S. Price turned turtle after November 1913 storm, Lake Huron (Marine 
Review 43 1914:432). 
 
 One approach that can be used for the broader understanding of depositional theory as 
well as within the context of this thesis is to classify wreck types. The map created by Brown in 
his book White Hurricane: A Great Lakes November Gale and America’s Deadliest Maritime 
Disaster, is a map indicating which vessels were stranded and which ones foundered (Brown 
2002:203). This thesis further divides the wrecks by indicating which stranded vessels suffered a 
total loss and which ones were capable of being refloated after the maritime disaster. How a 
vessel wrecked is revealing of the ferocity of the storm as well as the final contributions to the 
wreck site from the crew. Weather is revealing and needs to be part of shipwreck studies. “If the 
local weather and water conditions are known, or can be determined, a great deal can be 
predicted regarding the expected aspect and condition of the wreck, and the distribution of the 
wreckage. If they are not known, it may be possible to infer them from the condition of the 
wreck” (O’Shea 2002:213). Conditions of the Great Storm of 1913 were recorded; 
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meteorologists were able to record many of the conditions close to shore and in the larger towns. 
Survivors of the storm were able to tell their observations of the wind, gusts, and waves in the 
middle of the lakes. During the early 20th century, meteorologist had no way to accurately 
measure storm variables in the middle of the lakes where ships met their demise. The 
retrospective model is used as the backbone to the statistical analysis portion of this thesis. 
 Archaeological sites are riddled with extracting filters and scrambling devices. Extracting 
filters are “processes that remove material from the site so that they are not present for 
discovery,” and scrambling devices are “processes that move material from their primary 
context” (O’Shea 2002:214). Extracting filters are detrimental to archaeological interpretation 
because they physically remove evidence from a site. Scrambling filters tend to also disrupt 
archaeological interpretation, though this thesis will look at scrambling filters as part of the 
formulaic equation to explain site formation processes. Scrambling filters are not consistently 
“randomizing” nor do they always create “pattern diminishing effect.” Scrambling filters may 
introduce a consistent framework for organization in the site because many cultural and non-
cultural transformation processes are inherently patterned (O’Shea 2002:214). This includes 
wind patterns, ice shove, salvage efforts, and wave action. These filters may affect how 
archaeologists view stranded vessels from the Great Storm of 1913. One drastic pattern is that 
the majority of strandings on the Great Lakes are stern to the beach, this includes a variety of 
wind and current directions (Wayne Lusardi 2015, elec. comm.). This scrambling filter may sort 
the difference between wrecks in severe storms versus wrecks that occurred during milder 
weather. Vessels by the shore may by more drastically altered by environmental factors that 
affect the vessels’ bow heading. 
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Non-cultural transformation processes can severely change a site. One non-cultural 
transformation process that is unique to cold climate areas is ice shove. This natural phenomenon 
is on-shore ice push; it tends to occur on lakes larger than five miles in diameter and is the result 
of wind, currents, and changes in temperature. It tends to occur close to spring when ice thaws 
and winds increase (Lake Ice 2014). When lake ice begins to break apart with increasing 
temperatures, it becomes light enough to be moved by strong winds. When the wind is in excess 
of 30 miles per hour, broken pieces of ice can pile on to the shore. When the foremost piece of 
ice breaches the shore, the ice behind the ice edge will ram the foremost ice and create huge ice 
piles pushing onto the shore. Strong winds can make ice surge onto the shore with enough force 
to destroy homes. This pile up has been recorded as high as 36 feet in low gradient shorelines 
(Kives 2013). Ice shove can affect shipwreck site location because it can push a wreck out of 
context if a wreck is shallow. If the on-shore ice shove is thick enough, it may push a storm-
wrecked vessel out of its original context; though because the keel is often the heaviest 
assemblage and more likely to be buried by sediment, it may be less affected by the ice shove 
process.  
 Another non-cultural transformation process, similar to ice shove, is the occurrence of 
windrow ice on the Great Lakes. Ice is a powerful non-cultural transformation process. In winter, 
the Great Lakes glasses over with sheets of ice; the ice may be broken up from wave action and 
from icebreakers. Once a sheet of ice is broken into large chunks, the wind may move the ice 
into partly inclined floating masses called windrows (Hilton 2002:9). Windrows are similar to ice 






 Louisiana was the first vessel to be stranded by the Great Storm of 1913. Fortunately, the 
entire crew survived and the captain was able to recount the events leading up to the wrecking 
event. Captain McDonald hoped to protect his vessel and crew by heading into Washington 
Harbor, Washington Island, Lake Michigan. The wind pushed over 70 mph, which resulted in the 
vessel being unable to hold its anchors in heavy seas. The captain did not continue to drive into 
the storm, despite Louisiana being a steamer. He opted to drop anchor. The anchor cables would 
ultimately break, resulting in the vessel being pushed into the southeast part of the harbor by the 
storm (Wisconsin Sea Grant and Wisconsin Historical Society 2015). This may have been 
Captain McDonald’s choice, to drop anchors rather than power into the storm, knowing that his 
vessel’s engines would become ineffective in the storm. The wreck of the wooden bulk freighter, 
Louisiana lays parallel to shore on the northern end of Washington Island in Washington Harbor, 
though that may have not always been the case. Immediately after the wrecking event, the crew 
opted to stay in the vessel in hopes of riding out the storm since the waves were too high and 
unpredictable to make a safe journey to shore. By morning, however, the vessel caught fire and 
the entire crew had to jump ship in a life-saving raft to avoid being burned alive. Though there 
were doubt among the crew, all eventually made it safely to shore (Wisconsin Sea Grant and 
Wisconsin Historical Society 2015). Louisiana is close to shore today, so close that a lifeboat 
seems unnecessary. This perpetuates the idea that Louisiana’s position may have significantly 
changed since its initial wrecking event. 
 Cultural transformations may be difficult to calculate since they can be unpredictable. 
Housing developments are now situated across the entire island and there are permanent 
residents that live on the peripheries of Washington Harbor. FIGURE 3.4 depicts the population 
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settlement and Louisiana on Washington Island. A population close to a wreck site could 
increase cultural site formation processes on a wreck. Dredging also occurs in the harbor; 
therefore, it is possible that the vessel has been moved from its initial deposition context. Due to 
its proximity to the shoreline, it is likely that this vessel has been affected by non-cultural 
transformation processes. The bottom of the southeast harbor is bedrock, so it is likely that the 
vessel has not shifted drastically. Ice shove may be the most plausible culprit if the wreck has 












FIGURE 3.4. Sunken Louisiana today in context with housing development (Author; Google 
Earth; Flash Earth 2015). 
 
Wooden vessels can be more fragile than composite and metal ships, and therefore, more 
likely to be broken up by wind, ice, or wave action (O’Shea 2002:217). The initial wrecking 
process, in the case of Louisiana, seems to have contributed tremendously to the damage of the 
vessel, though it is impossible to know for sure due to the fire that occurred almost immediately 
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after the wrecking. Once Louisiana was wrecked, it lost timbers and disarticulated wreckage may 
have occurred. Wreckage of the wooden bulk carrier is distributed high on the beach, far from 
the water’s normal reach, indicating a high intensity storm, or that the wreck has been salvaged. 
Since the keel is the backbone of the vessel that was used to understand the initial wrecking 
pattern, as seen in historical pictures as well as to determine the vessel’s orientation today, which 
appears to differ slightly from the initial wrecking. The keel assembly is at the bottom (Dear and 
Kemp 2006:298) and unless the vessel has capsized, may be the best starting point to understand 
a vessel’s orientation to shore.  
 Another cultural transformation process prevalent on the Lakes is salvage. After a 
shipwreck, companies or insurance agents may sell the wreck to salvors in an attempt to get the 
highest return from their wrecked vessel. Salvaging on the Great Lakes was common; this 
includes refloating a wrecked but intact vessel. The boiler of Louisiana is said to have been 
salvaged May 1920. In August 1920, salvagers also removed the engine and scattered much of 
the wreck in the process. The propeller, propeller shaft, and rudder are missing as well and may 
have been salvaged during this time (Wisconsin Sea Grant and Wisconsin Historical Society 
2015). 
The previous section worked through different site formation processes and theories that 
had the potential to have changed the wreck sites in the Great Storm of 1913. Behavioral 
archaeology comes to the forefront here as it is concerned with site formation processes that 
transform the systemic context of a site and the dynamic relationship between humans and 
cultural material. To understand artifacts and human behavior, it is first necessary to understand 
the processes and transformations that have occurred since deposition
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY FOR AN EXPLANATORY MODEL 
 
 This thesis aims to create an explanatory model that will reveal a pattern between ships 
stranded and foundered during the Great Storm of 1913 and the storm fronts that wrecked them. 
To catalogue these wrecks, this project visits historic newspapers, Marine Reviews circa 1913, 
and secondary sources to find shipwrecks and their known locations. This thesis relied on 
modern technologies (GPS, UTM, Loran numbers) to ascertain accurate ship coordinates as well 
as understand the storm’s movement from the recently created retrospective model. The final 
step of this thesis was to use the information stated above to see if there is statistical significance 
in the values of the shipwrecks’ coordinates in correlation with the storm’s movements.  
 This chapter opens by identifying the methodology used to gather and analyze 
information. This section will begin by looking at primary and secondary sources and later 
attempt to more accurately plot the wrecks on a macro scale creating maps to show wreck 
orientation. Regardless of the outcome, this thesis will immediately improve the current 
positioning of Great Storm of 1913 shipwrecks from Brown’s 2002 shipwreck map of 
November, 1913 vessels (Brown 2002:203).  
PRIMARY SOURCES 
 The maps created were twofold: one to show where each wreck location is, where the 
refloated vessels were, and where the missing wrecks are assumed to be; the other map created 
shows the orientation of each vessel that was wrecked during the storm. These maps fulfill 
different purposes: one to enhance the general positioning of the Great Storm of 1913 
shipwrecks, the other to give a more scientific approach in the understanding of shipwrecks and 
storm movement in the Great Lakes to see if there is a pattern or equation that may be gleaned 
from the information to help explain the November, 1913 wrecking positions. Another 
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possibility, if an explanatory model is created, is to see if unidentified shipwrecks may be later 
correlated to the storm that wrecked them. It should be noted that if an equation is found, it 
would only be applicable to the Great Lakes because of the meteorological differentiations 
worldwide.  
 It was necessary to create both maps using as many primary sources as possible rather 
than rely on secondary sources containing the positions of the Great Storm of 1913 shipwrecks 
for this study. Primary sources ensured that each vessel was individually examined and exact 
coordinates were found or approximated rather than gauged to be in the same position as that 
displayed in another map. There were exceptions, but most locations were gleaned from historic 
newspapers or from people who had actually visited these locations and saved the coordinates 
using GPS. Newspapers referenced included: The Washington Times, The Ogden Standard, The 
Sturgeon Advocate, Buffalo News, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sault Evening News, Detroit News, 
Globe, and the Port-Huron Times Herald. Newspapers did not offer exact coordinates; they 
offered geographic references that were applicable when referring to a map. Newspapers varied 
from large papers interested in the entire scope of the November storm to local newspapers that 
only had information relevant to their geographic area. Multiple newspapers were helpful to 
cross-reference one another as well as add more information to the scope of individual 
shipwrecks (The Ogden Standard 1913:8; The Washington Times 1913:1). Historical newspapers 
occasionally offered exact mileage and heading to a shipwreck (Buffalo News 1914a:1;1914b:10; 
Globe 1913:1). 
Another means to approximate the location of a wrecked and then refloated vessel, since 
coordinates were not available, was to use historical photographs that showed stranded vessels 
prior to being moved. These photographs were attained from repositories of Life-Saving 
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Stations, Wisconsin Sea Grant, Wisconsin Historical Society and Thunder Bay Research 
Collection (Webb 2004; Swayze 2014). There are no coordinates associated with newspaper and 
historical repository photographs, however, there seems to be a larger degree of accuracy with 
these historical photographs versus relying on newspapers for mileage between known and 
unknown locations. The advantage of photographs is that reference points in the photograph can 
still be seen and compared with satellite imagery from Google Earth and Flash Earth. FIGURE 
4.1 shows stranded vessel Louisiana in the foreground of its location in Washington Harbor, 
Washington Island, Wisconsin. The remnants of Louisiana are still in place, or close to this same 
orientation today. In the background of the historical photograph lies stranded vessel, Halstead. 
Halstead was quickly refloated and reused, so coordinates are not available. The historical 
photograph allows for the vessel to be fairly accurately placed in Google Earth. 
FIGURE 4.1. Total loss Louisiana in foreground, stranded vessel Halstead in background 
(Swayze 2014). 
 
 With the exception of Louisiana, GPS coordinates for other wreck sites were not taken 
first-hand, the thesis relies instead on individuals or dive shops who visited these site (Dive Site 
56 
 
Directory 2008; National Marine Sanctuaries and NOAA 2013; Wayne Lusardi 2014, pers. 
comm.). 
 Since Brown’s Great Storm of 1913 map was constructed (2002:203), Henry B. Smith has 
been located 30 miles due north of Marquette, Michigan. The coordinates have not been made 
publically available, however, a member of the exploration team gave the vessel’s approximate 
orientation through degree headings as well as a digitized representation of the wreck as of 2013. 
In FIGURE 4.2, Ken Merryman and crew not only gave location and orientation, but a digital 
rendering of the vessel that shows the condition after a century resting at the bottom of Lake 
Superior at more than 500 feet in depth (Ken Merryman 2015, elec. comm.). 
FIGURE 4.2. Digital rendering of Henry B. Smith after 2013 discovery (Courtesy of Ken 
Merryman 2015, elec. comm.). 
 
 Outside of references to the November, 1913 storm, this thesis is heavily rooted in theory 
and required the expertise of various archaeologists to build the explanatory model. Theory was 
a necessary component because it established what theories were already in place and what 
nautical archaeologists still called for to be researched (O’Shea 2002:211 –227; Gibbs 2006:1). 
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Looking at theory ensured that necessary components of factors influencing the wrecking 
process were examined as well as cultural and non-cultural transformation processes that 
affected the vessel at the post-depositional stage (Schiffer 1975:838 –841;Muckelroy 1976:282 –
288). These theories look at the wrecking process as a series of stages that could be broken down 
to encompass the different factors that affected the vessel’s state in the archaeological record. 
Other theories explored looking at the human element in terms of disaster response. Disaster 
responses catalogue the actions people go through and the percentages of people able to make 
responsible or hazardous decisions during a time of crisis. The stages of disaster response delved 
into a psychological factor that often are neglected when deciphering the clues of a shipwreck 
(Gibbs 2006:6). 
 Theories surrounding maritime disaster events, produced thesis’ variables. These 
variables must always be taken into account during any analysis and may explain why the 
November, 1913 shipwrecks may not align in a predictable manner. This thesis is a hypothesis so 
therefore may be proven null. If proven null, there needs to be a thorough understanding why 
associated randomness of shipwreck founderings may be impossible to explain. 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
 Secondary sources provided the best way to understand the ferocity of the storm in an 
already analyzed manner. The first sources read was David Brown’s White Hurricane (2002) and 
Frank Barcus’ Freshwater Fury (1986). These sources gave an overall understanding of the 
storm, offered good reference sections on the storm, and furnished a base for what had not been 
covered concerning the Great Storm of 1913. These sources provided excellent information 
about the storm’s movement, firsthand accounts of those who survived the storm, and the general 
placement of each wreck. Maps from Brown and Barcus were informative and helped visual 
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learners understand the impact of the storm. The sheer volume of stranded and foundered vessels 
initiated the need to make an updated map. Vessels such as C. W. Eliphicke and Donaldson, 
which had wrecked on October 21, 1913 and were made impossible to salvage by the Great 
Storm of 1913, did not need to be included (Marine Review Vol. 44 1915: 41 –42; Brown 
2002:203; Wachter and Wachter 2003:76). 
 Sources that also aided in filling the information gap were Marine Review Vol. 43 and 
Marine Review Vol. 44. These were written in 1914 and 1915, respectively. These sources 
reviewed and interpreted crucial events of the previous year in the Great Lakes. The Marine 
Reviews not only gave the location of the vessels stranded, foundered, and refloated, but offered 
causality count, first-hand accounts from captains, and the financial costs of the storm. The 
Marine Reviews attempted to unravel why so many mariners and vessels were affected, and 
ultimately, examined the unprecedented ferocity of the storm (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914: 430 
–444; Marine Review Vol. 44 1915: 41 –44). FIGURE 4.3 differentiates between the “Total 
Losses” and the “Constructive Total Losses” after the Great November Storm. The chart includes 
information such as carrying capacity, value of the vessel, what the vessel was insured for, the 
cargo, what the cargo was insured for, and the location of the accident, this being the most 
important information for the report. The cargo of each vessel was also important as it impacted 
whether the vessel was light or loaded, which was one of the factors in determining how easily a 




FIGURE 4.3 Total and Constructive Losses for Vessels of 1913 Storm (Marine Review Vol. 43 
1914:439). This is not an inclusive list of stranded vessels. 
 
 Other secondary sources that proved to be invaluable were sources created by NOAA in 
anticipation of the 2013 centennial of the 1913 storm. These sources included information such 
as where the vessels are located today, modern assessments of how winds and gales are 
measured, interpretation of the storm and vessels affected, and how lake-effect snow works in 
conjunction with warm and cold air masses (National Marine Sanctuaries and NOAA 2013; 
National Weather Service and NOAA 2013; NOAA 2013a; NOAA 2013c). These sources added 
a sense of reliability to the general understanding of the storm as they were created by an 
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institution rooted in the exploration of maritime history as well as meteorological sciences. They 
had the most up-to-date information concerning the “meteorological bomb” that hit the Great 
Lakes, November, 1913 (Clark et. al 2013; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:1 –45). This information 
included the transformation in thought from believing that there was a total of three fronts, two 
polar fronts and a warm front that resulted in the Great Storm of 1913 (Brown 2002:42, 213) to a 
more sophisticated manner of understanding the storm, which showed that the Lakes had been 
retaining heat, which in turn reacted with the low pressure fronts titled the “Pre-Storm” and 
eventual “White Hurricane” which crossed the Great Lakes Basin (Clark et. al 2013; 
Wagenmaker et al. 2013:7 –14).  
Updated information adds insight into the storm and offers a jumping-off point where 
new research can attempt to unravel more about the historic storm. This thesis would not have 
been possible without NOAA and their collaborations with other researchers to re-look at the 
Great Storm of 1913. 
Since this thesis is trying to create an explanatory model pertaining to the shipwrecks of 
the Great Storm of 1913 and the low pressure fronts that caused it, meteorological climate jargon 
was necessary to understand and use. Climatology uses its own set of definitions, however, there 
is little debate between these definitions. Regardless of the definition, various sites were used to 
create a common knowledge background for this thesis, including NOAA and Michigan Sea 
Grant (NOAA 2013c; Michigan Sea Grant 2013).  
MACRO MAP 
 Prior to the creation of the orientation map, an updated map of the Great Storm of 1913, 
and the ships that it wrecked, the ships that were refloated, and the vessels still missing, was 
created. Older maps were helpful but were not always accurate. Problematic issues in older maps 
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included: incorrect shipwreck locations, no differentiation between what wrecks had been found 
and which ones were still missing, and maps which included shipwrecks that were not actually 
caused by the November, 1913 storm. FIGURE 4.4 shows the most popular Great Storm of 1913 
map. 
 To remedy the situation, a map was created that did not use any references from earlier 
secondary sources. The updated map was created solely from newspapers, Marine Reviews Vol. 
43 and Vol. 44, historic photographs, and from people who dove on the wrecks recreationally and 
scientifically. 
 The new map was made in Google Earth because it has the ability to put in exact 
coordinates, show the reefs, shoals, and points where vessels wrecked, and importantly has a 
built in distance finder while allowing for multiple data layers. The first wreck added to the map 
was Louisiana; the reasoning behind this was that this was the only site that had been visited and 
dived on by the author, it referenced a first-hand account, and it can be seen in Google Earth. 
Brown’s 2002 map mistakenly shows Louisiana on the eastern side of the Door County 
Peninsula when the wreck is actually in Washington Harbor on Washington Island. The 
placement marker is put directly in the center of the wreck. While researching Louisiana, a 
picture was found that had Halstead in the background (Swayze 2014). Using Google Earth in 
conjunction with knowledge of the Washington Harbor area allowed for the Halstead placement 















































FIGURE 4.5. Location of Louisiana and Halstead. Blue indicates the vessel is still there, green 
indicates the vessel has been refloated or rebuilt. 
 
Marine Reviews Vol. 43 and Vol. 44 were the next sources read to see what belonged on 
the shipwreck map. These reviews are published annually since the November storm was so 
significant, more details of it were given in the following year (Marine Review Vol. 44 1915:41 –
44). These were good sources because they listed every accident on the Lakes and described 
where the accident was, so long as the vessel was not still missing. Even if the vessel was 
missing, the source had information regarding where the vessel was assumed to be. From these 
sources, a list was compiled of all the shipwrecks that were affected during the storm. From 
there, it was a matter of finding each shipwreck in a newspaper source concerning its 
whereabouts or look to modern sources to find the exact coordinates of a wreck. Shipwrecks 
were organized based on where they foundered or stranded. From there, each area was 
researched and put into a Google Earth map. 
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 The other vessels affected by the November storm on Lake Michigan were Plymouth and 
Pontiac. The older map showed Plymouth on the northwest side of Washington Island, Green 
Bay. Historic newspapers indicate Plymouth and crew were lost close to Gull Island, Lake 
Michigan (The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:432, 439). The older 
map did not include Pontiac, which was alleged to have been stranded on the shoals by modern 
day Mackinac Bridge (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:438). Newspapers indicate that there was not 
as much lake traffic on Lake Michigan. Despite many people purposely avoiding Lake Michigan 
during the storm, there was still much damage. Not only did Pontiac wreck and Louisiana catch 
fire after pounding into the shoals (Cooper 1989:93 –96), but Plymouth foundered. In addition, 
multiple people who tied their boats carefully to the docks lost their vessels due to the 2-inch 
cables breaking, adding these unnamed victims to the storm (Sturgeon Bay Advocate 1913:1) 
FIGURE 4.6 shows the stranded and foundered vessels in Lake Michigan. TABLE 4.1 shows 
source information for each wreck location. 
FIGURE 4.6. Vessels stranded and foundered in Lake Michigan. Green indicates the vessel has 




Vessel Source Information 
Louisiana Cooper 1989:93 
Halstead Sturgeon Bay Advocate 1913: 1; Washington 
Times 1913:1; Swazye 2014 
Plymouth The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:432, 439;  
Pontiac Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:438 
 TABLE 4.1. Vessels associated with source information on Lake Michigan. 
 
Lake Ontario was the only Great Lake to come away unscathed after the Great Storm of 
1913. Lake Erie had one ship founder, Lightship Vessel No. 82 (The Ogden Standard 1913:8; The 
Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439; Berger and Dempster 2002:88). 
The rest of the vessels affected on Lake Erie were stranded and able to be refloated in the 
following days. One such vessel was the G. J. Grammer (The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review 43 1914:436 –437). Other vessels in close proximity to Lake Erie included those that 
were stranded in the St. Clair River, close to Detroit, and in Lake St. Clair; these vessels 
included: Robert Fulton, Victory, W. G. Pollock, and Saxona (The Washington Times 1913:1; 
Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:437 –439). The updated map took out vessels C. W. Elphicke and 
Donaldson because they had been wrecked on October 21, 1913 (Marine Review Vol. 43 
1914:482; Marine Review 44 1915:41). The updated map also moved Saxona up the St. Clair 
River rather than in Lake St. Clair (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439). FIGURE 4.7 shows an 
updated version of Lake Erie, Lake St. Clair, and the St. Clair River. TABLE 4.2 shows vessels 






























































TABLE 4.2 Vessels associated with source information on Lake Erie. 
 
Lake Huron was hit the hardest by the Great Storm of 1913 in terms of lives lost and 
vessels foundered. On 9 November, from 6 pm until midnight, nine large vessels and over 200 
men were lost to the storm (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:37). This was the most deadly six-hour 
period during the November storm. The updated map changes include some minor variations in 
vessel location based on differences gauged in newspapers versus the popular November storm 
map. A minor change is for the vessel J. M. Jenks, which had previously been located right 
outside of Midland, in a pocket of the Georgian Bay. The new map shows J. M. Jenks a few 
miles north of Midland; newspapers reported that J. M. Jenks had been stranded in the area of 
Midland but not in port (The Washington Times 1913:1). The other reasoning for this change is 
because in a storm with 90 mph gusts, it is hard to imagine that a vessel would have been able to 
make a tight turn to get into port. Another source says the vessel was a few miles north of 
Midland (Heden 1966:37). 
Another change in the Lake Huron map is the more drastic repositioning in a few vessel 
locations. John A. McGean was originally shown to be north of the Oscoda Charter Township 
and it has been moved to be just east of Port Austin. This change comes directly from a modern 
day Maritime Waterway Trail, which has the vessel east of Port Austin; this location has 
Vessel Source Information 
Lightship Vessel No. 82 The Ogden Standard 1913:8; The Washington 
Times 1913:1; Buffalo News 1914:1;  Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:432, 440; Berger and 
Dempster 2002:88 
G. J. Grammer The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:436 –437 
Robert Fulton The Washington Times 1913:1 
Victory Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:438 
W. G. Pollock Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:437 
Saxona Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439 
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coordinates that put the vessel southeast of Saginaw Bay (Michigan Heritage Water Trails 2014; 
Wayne Lusardi 2014, pers. comm.). The map also includes Lightship Vessel No. 61, which was 
stranded at the mouth of the St. Clair River; this vessel had not been included previously (The 
Washington Times 1913:1; Brown 2002:203). 
The next relocated vessel was A. E. Stewart, taken out of the Lake Huron map and put 
into the Lake Superior map. The older map indicated the vessel was lost south of Thunder Bay 
when historical newspapers indicate that the vessel was actually stranded and refloated in 
Whitefish Bay, Lake Superior (The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 43 
1914:438). The vessel that was close to where the old map indicated A. E. Stewart to be was 
Arcadian, which was a vessel stranded on the reefs outside Sulphur Island, in Thunder Bay, 
Michigan (The Washington Times 1913:1). 
The last alteration in the Lake Huron map is solely an interpretative difference between 
the ideas of where James Carruthers and Hydrus lie, as neither of these vessels have yet been 
found. The older map show James Carruthers and Hydrus in close proximity to Wexford, which 
are all in the southeastern side of Lake Huron. Research indicates that James Carruthers was en 
route to Midland, Ontario. This city is in the southeast corner of Georgian Bay. James 
Carruthers was one of the newest vessels on the Lakes; the vessel was heavy and built with extra 
steel to ensure seaworthiness (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:435). This map indicates that the 
vessel foundered close to the turning point to get into Georgian Bay. The entrance to the Bay is 
small and with sustained gale force winds, the updated maps indicate the vessel was unable to 
make the turn. The other interpretive change goes with Hydrus, which was southbound to the St. 
Clair River (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:435; NOAA and Regional Collaboration 2013). Rather 
























































western side of Lake Huron because that is where the strongest gusts were pushing 
(Wagenmaker et al. 2013:16 –27). FIGURES 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 show the updated Lake Huron 
maps. TABLE 4.3 shows the source information for vessels affected by the storm on Lake 
Huron. 




FIGURE 4.9. Detail of western Lake Huron. Blue indicates the vessel is still there, green 




FIGURE 4.10. Detail of southern Lake Huron. Blue indicates the vessel is still there, green 






Vessel Source Information 
J. M. Jenks The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:438 
James Carruthers Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:435 
Isaac M. Scott National Marine Sanctuaries and NOAA 
2013; Wayne Lusardi 2014, pers. comm. 
Arcadian The Washington Times 1913:1 
Hydrus Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:435; NOAA and 
Regional Collaboration 2013 
Matoa The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:432 
H. M. Hanna Jr. The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:430, 443  
John A. McGean Michigan Heritage Water Trails 2014; Wayne 
Lusardi 2014, pers. comm. 
D. O. Mills Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:438 
Wexford Dive Site Directory 2008 
Regina Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439; Wayne 
Lusardi 2014, pers. comm. 
Charles S. Price Wayne Lusardi 2014, pers. comm. 
Northern Queen Maritime Review Vol. 43 1914:439 
H. B. Hawgood The Washington Times 1913:1; Maritime 
Review Vol. 43 1914:437 
Matthew Andrews The Washington Times 1913:1 
Lightship Vessel No. 61 The Washington Times 1913:1 
Argus Jared Diamond 2015, elec. comm. 
TABLE 4.3. Source information for vessels affected by the storm on Lake Huron. 
 
 The next section of the map is St. Mary’s River. The original map showed F. G. Hartwell 
and J. T. Hutchinson at the northwest side of the river; it showed Meaford at the bottom of St. 
Mary’s River. Newspaper sources indicate that Hartwell and Hutchinson are in the correct 
position before being refloated, however, the sources indicate that Meaford was in the second 
northern-most bend the St. Mary’s River (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439). Another difference 
in the maps is the placement of Scottish Hero. The older map said the location was unknown and 
it was assumed that it was lost somewhere in Lake Superior. Newspaper sources say, “The 
steamer Scottish Hero was driven ashore in Mud Lake and eight lights near the West Neebish cut 
were put out and washed away” (The Sault Evening News 1913:1). Research indicated that the 
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vessel was en route to Lake Superior (Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439). There is no Mud Lake 
off St. Mary’s River today, however, there is a Munuscong Lake off St. Mary’s River, which 
used to be named Mud Lake in the early 1900s (Ahart et al. 2014:497). This reasoning would put 
Scottish Hero on the western side of Munuscong Lake. FIGURE 4.11 shows the wrecks in the St. 
Mary’s River. TABLE 4.4 shows source information for vessels affected on the St Mary’s River. 
 
FIGURE 4.11. Sault Strait Marie wrecks. Green indicates the vessel has been refloated or rebuilt.  
 
TABLE 4.4. Shows source information for vessels affected on the St. Mary’s River. 
 Lake Superior is the largest of the Great Lakes; it was hit by both the pre-storm and the 
Great Storm. The majority of the ships affected by the storm were in the southeast corner of the 
Vessel Source Information 
Scottish Hero Sault Evening News 1913:1; Ahart et al. 
2014:497 
Meaford Marine Review Vol. 43:439 
F. G. Hartwell The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:437 
J. T. Hutchinson The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:438 
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lakes, close to the locks at Sault Strait Marie. In the original map, William Nottingham was 
wrecked in the Apostle Islands, however, newspapers indicate “that the steamer Nottingham ran 
aground on Paresian Island, twenty miles from Whitefish Bay” (Globe 1913:1; Marine Review 
Vol. 43 1914:437). A. E. Stewart was re-located in the new map to be in Whitefish Bay (The 
Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:438). Henry B. Smith was found in 
2013. It is close to the spot where the original placement marker indicated; updated information 
shows the vessel almost 30 miles due north of Marquette (Ken Merryman 2015, elec. comm.).  
 Huronic, Major, Turret Chief, L. C. Waldo, and Leafield were all in similar spots as the 
older map. These vessels were cited in both the Marine Reviews as well as newspapers 
(Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:430 –444; Marine Review Vol. 44 
1915:41 –44). There appears to be a lot of stranded vessel congestion in Whitefish Bay. The 
cause of this may be from vessels leaving the Sault Locks, which at its widest, is only about a 
mile wide, and then rapidly having to deal with the winds that accompany a large lake. Once on 
Lake Superior, mariners would have to face unprotected waters that greeted them with raging 
winds and gigantic waves. FIGURE 4.12 shows the updated map of the vessels foundered and 
stranded on Lake Superior. TABLE 4.5 shows source information for vessels affected on Lake 
Superior. 
The vessels indicated on the maps above are the ones that foundered or were stranded in 
such a manner that they needed assistance to get out of the reefs, shoals, and shores. Many other 
vessels were stranded by the November storm, but were able to free themselves; others lost 
anchors, hatches and a variety of other parts from their vessels (Marine Review Vol. 43 
1914:439; Marine Review Vol. 44 1915:42 –43). TABLE 4.6 includes stranded vessels 
mentioned in Marine Review Vol. 44 that were not mentioned in the 1914 annual report. The 
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strandings were mild and did not jeopardize the crew as the aforementioned wrecks (Marine 
Review Vol. 43 1914:430 –444). These vessels were not included in the study because this thesis 
focuses on vessels stuck in a manner that were unable to free themselves, be it through the 
ferocity of the storm or as an effect of their own responses during the disaster. FIGURE 4.13 


































































Vessel Source Information 
William Nottingham Globe 1913:1; The Washington Times 1913:1; 
Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:438 
Huronic The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review 
Vol. 43 1914:439 
Major Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:439 
A. E. Stewart The Washington Times 1913:1; Marine Review 
Vol. 43 1914:438 
L. C. Waldo Ogden Standard 1913:8; The Washington 
Times 1913:1 
Turret Chief Ogden Standard 1913:8; The Washington 
Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 44 1915:41 
Henry B. Smith Ken Merryman 2015, pers. comm. 
Leafield Ogden Standard 1913:8; The Washington 
Times 1913:1; Marine Review Vol. 43 
1914:432 
TABLE 4.5. Source information for vessels affected on Lake Superior. 
 
Date Vessel Accident Location 
Nov. 8 Edward Buckley Ran Ashore Harbor Beach, Lake Huron 
Nov. 8 Col. J. M. Schoonmaker Ran Ashore Mission River, Lake 
Superior 
Nov. 8 C.F. Ann Arbor No. 4 Ran Ashore Green Island, Lake 
Michigan 




Nov. 9 Rhoda Emily Beached In Storm Harbor Beach, Lake Huron 











































The next part of the map-making process is based on the orientation of vessels foundered 
or stranded during the storm. The data becomes more limited in this section as most of the 
vessels affected by the storm did not have their bow and stern direction recorded prior to being 
removed or refloated. The data may be so limited here in that it may be impossible to make a true 
assessment of whether an explanatory model is possible to make or if vessel orientation during a 
foundering or stranding process is randomized to the individual shipwreck. The following 
section will attempt to design maps using vessel orientation as the basis for shipwreck 
placement.  
 Once again, the first example of shipwreck orientation on the updated map will be 
Louisiana, as that was the first wreck visited by the author. This wreck’s bow currently faces 
south, however the original picture of Louisiana stranded shows the vessel’s bow pointing 
southeast (picture in previous section). A major cultural transformation process affecting the 
vessel is that in 1920, the vessel’s engines and boilers were salvaged. Historic photographs show 
the vessel rising high above the waterline, yet today the vessel is entirely submerged. The 
stranded vessel has been notably affected by cultural processes as well as non-cultural 
transformation processes, which include yearly ice, particularly in the form of ice shove 
(Wisconsin Sea Grant and Wisconsin Historical Society 2015). FIGURE 4.14 shows Louisiana 
shortly after wrecking in the November storm. 
 Halstead was also stranded in Washington Harbor, Washington Island, Wisconsin. This 
vessel was refloated quickly after the Great Storm because it was able to face the storm without 
too much damage. The bow and stern have been located using a historical photograph that shows 
the vessel broadside at the end of the harbor (Wisconsin Sea Grant and Wisconsin Historical 
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Society 2015). FIGURE 4.15 illustrates the vessel with its bow and stern in a west to east 
position. FIGURE 4.16 shows both vessels orientated using Google Earth. 
 
FIGURE 4.14 Louisiana shortly after wrecking and burning in the November storm ice 





FIGURE 4.15. Halstead stranded on Washington Island, bow facing west (Wisconsin Sea Grant 




FIGURE 4.16. Illustration of vessels Louisiana and Halstead bow and stern position. Arrow 
points in direction of bow (Cooper 1989:93; Wisconsin Sea Grant and Wisconsin Historical 
Society 2015). 
 
 Lake Superior also has two wreck orientation sites, Henry B. Smith, and L. C. Waldo. 
Smith was found in 2013; the team that found the shipwreck offered its general location a little 
less than 30 miles due north of Marquette, as well as the bow’s direction, the heading between 10 
and 20 degrees (Ken Merryman 2015, elec. comm.). L. C. Waldo is no longer on Lake Superior 
as it was refloated to another location after the storm; however, its location and orientation is 
known because of the captain’s account during the storm, which can be seen in Frank Barcus’ 
Freshwater Fury (1960:33 –44) and a historical photograph (Webb 2004). FIGURE 4.17 shows 
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a historical photograph of L. C. Waldo and FIGURE 4.18 shows vessel orientation on Lake 
Superior.  
 




FIGURE 4.18. Vessels Henry B. Smith and L. C. Waldo’s orientation in Lake Superior (Barcus 
1960:33 –44;Ken Merryman 2015, elec. comm.). 
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 The final orientation map is of Lake Huron, which was affected most severely. The 
vessels orientated on this map are: Wexford, H. M. Hanna Jr., Regina, Charles S. Price, Isaac M. 
Scott, John A. McGean and Argus. The positioning for Wexford comes from Paul Carroll, a 
marine historian who visited the wreck after it was discovered and who stays in close contact 
with divers on the wreck who plot the wreck’s position (Paul Carroll 2015, elec. comm.). The 
positioning for H.M. Hanna Jr. is taken from a first-hand account. The chief engineer reported 
his experiences on Lake Huron on H. M. Hanna Jr. in Marine Review Vol. 43 (1914:443). 
Orientation coordinates for Regina came from state maritime archaeologist, Wayne Lusardi 
(2014, pers. comm.). Regina capsized but is still in one piece, the coordinates are from the stern 
and the mid-ship. The orientation for Isaac M. Scott, John A. McGean, and Argus came from 
technical diver, Jared Daniel, a worker at Anchor Bay Scuba (2015, elec. comm.). Information 
for Charles S. Price’s orientation came from a variety of dive shops, all of whom agreed on the 
positioning (Jared Daniel 2015, elec. comm.; Wayne Brusate 2015, elec. comm.). FIGURE 4.19 
and 4.20 shows Lake Superior and the vessels sunk and stranded. 
FIGURE 4.19 Vessel orientation, southern end of Lake Huron (Wayne Lusardi 2014, pers. 




FIGURE 4.20. Vessel orientation in the middle of Lake Huron (Jared Daniel 2015, elec. comm.; 





WEATHER DATASETS AND SHIPWRECK PLACEMENT 
The following section builds a retrospective model to see how hard the winds were 
blowing as well as what time the wind was blowing when a vessel was lost. This is a necessary 
step before SPSS analysis. SPSS, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, is a software 
program that is used for statistical analysis; it works to allow researchers the power to compute 
statistically significant correlations among other easy-to-use research based tools. This section 
relies on the retrospective model that was made for the centennial anniversary of the November 
storm. There is a caveat to the times associated with each wrecking, and that is because most 
vessels lacked onboard radio communication; the times of each wrecking will be estimated 
(Wagenmaker et al. 2013:3). The storm halted its progress over various storm centers for 10 to 
20 hour periods, which should allow enough leeway for wrecked vessels to be accurately paired 
with the direction of the wind. These storm centers were areas that had sustaining hurricane force 
winds, meaning more than 74 mph (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:28). The tables will be organized by 
the date each vessel wrecked; the wind direction will be taken from the area each vessel wrecked 
on the map in conjunction with the time the vessel was stranded or became foundered. The 
retrospective model has information on 7 and 8 November, however, this model does not begin 
until the two fronts combine. To get wind direction, old, hand drawn maps from Environment 
Canada –Toronto, will be used. The combined fronts moved clockwise and it will be assumed 
that the pre-storm moved clock-wise as well. The wind speed will be gathered from personal 
accounts. The tables below will only have the wrecks whose orientation is known. FIGURE 4.21 
shows the hand drawn map from Environment Canada –Toronto on 8 November, 1913, 8am 




FIGURE 4.21. Hand drawn map from Environment Canada –Toronto on 8 November, 1913, 
8am (Author; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:8). Lake Superior, Michigan, Huron are outlined. 
 
TABLE 4.7 depicts the vessels affected by the storm on November 8, 1913, whose bow 
and stern direction are fairly well estimated based on historical photos, first-hand accounts, or the 
vessel being in place today. November 8 is not included in the up-to-date retrospective model, so 
wind speed and direction were estimated using first-hand accounts in combination with 
contemporary weather maps. Louisiana is still resting in Washington Harbor, Washington Island, 
Wisconsin. L. C. Waldo wrecked on Manitou Island, close to the northeast end of the Keweenaw 
Peninsula. Waldo was refloated; it is in this study because the first-hand accounts of the captain 
allowed its orientation of wrecking to be known. Having ships whose orientation were known 
immediately following the storm will add another level of understanding to the study because it 
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allows a ship’s location to be known without a century of non-cultural and cultural 
transformation processes. 
Lake Vessel Time Wind Direction Wind Speed Bow to Stern 
Michigan Louisiana 12 –2am NW 70 mph S –N* 
Superior L. C. Waldo 6 –10pm NNW 70 mph E –W 
TABLE 4.7. Vessels affected on Saturday, 8 November, 1913 (Cooper 1989:93; Webb 2004; 
NOAA and Regional Collaboration 2013; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:8, 16). 
*Vessel originally positioned SE –NW in 1913 
 
 TABLE 4.8 looks at the vessels affected on Sunday November 9, 1913. Henry B. Smith 
was found in 2013; its coordinates are not specifically given. The exploration team that found the 
vessel gave the general location as well as the vessel’s orientation (Ken Merryman 2015, elec. 
comm.). H. M. Hanna Jr. was another vessel stranded by the November storm; the vessel was 
shortly refloated after the storm and reused. This vessel holds a similar position to L. C. Waldo, 
by putting it in the SPSS analysis; it may be possible to see how much vessels change during a 
century of non-cultural and cultural transformation processes, or it may show that ships wreck 
randomly and understanding shipwreck orientation cannot be calculated.  
TABLE 4.8. Vessels affected on Sunday, 9 November, 1913 (Marine Review Vol. 44 1915:493; 
NOAA and Regional Collaboration 2013; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:3, 26 –20). 
 TABLE 4.9 looks at the vessels that are believed to have been affected by the Great 
Storm the evening of the 9th through the morning of the 10th. The following vessels had no 
survivors and none were found in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Lightship Vessel No. 82 
was found in 1914, and in 1915 the vessel was recovered and rebuilt, however there are no 
descriptions of the orientation of the vessel prior to being salvaged (United States Coast Guard 
2014). Wexford, was found in 2000; there are still missing vessels on the Great Lakes affected by 
Lake Vessel Time Wind Direction Wind Speed Bow to Stern 
Superior Henry B. Smith 5 –8pm N 65 mph N –S 
Huron H. M. Hanna Jr. 10 –11pm NW 80 mph NW –SE 
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the November storm (NOAA and Regional Collaboration 2013). The orientation of the following 
vessels have not been tracked since their demise. Their orientation is what it is today, up-to-date. 
Lake Vessel Time Wind Direction Wind Speed Bow to Stern 
Erie Lightship 82 6pm –2am SW 70 mph * 
Huron Wexford 6pm –2am NW+ 25 –75 mph SE –NW 
Huron Isaac M. Scott 6pm –2am NW+ 60 –80 mph S –N  
Huron John A. McGean 6pm –2am NW+ 60 –80 mph NW –SE  
Huron Regina 6pm –2am NW+ 25 –75 mph NW –SE  
Huron Charles S. Price 6pm –2am NW+ 60 –75 mph S –N  
Huron Argus 6pm –2am NW+ 60 –80 mph SW –NE  
Michigan Halstead 5pm (Mon) NW 60 mph W –E  
TABLE 4.9. Vessels presumed to be affected on Sunday, 9 November, 6pm through Monday 
November 10, 2am 1913 (National Marine Sanctuary and NOAA 2013; Wagnemaker et. al. 
2013:21 –27; United States Coast Guard 2014; Wayne Lusardi 2014, pers. comm.; Jared Daniel 
2015, elec. comm.; Wisconsin Sea Grant and Wisconsin Historical Society 2015). 
*Lightship Vessel No. 82 was found “1-7/8 mi NNE from station at 63 feet; diver reported hull 
intact but interior wrecked, and no bodies found” (United States Coast Guard 2014). Reports do 
not say which way vessel was orientated, however, thought it important to identify specific 
location of wreck after winter of its wrecking.  
+Close to 2 am the low shifts, the upper part of Lake Huron receives northern winds and the 
southern part of Lake Huron receives western winds (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:18 –22). 
 
This chapter looked at the primary and secondary sources used in the creation of the 
updated maps for the Great Storm of 1913. The updated maps combined historical secondary 
sources, historical newspapers, and first-hand accounts to discover the location of vessels 
foundered and stranded during the storm. The second map section looked at the orientation of the 
vessels in conjunction with time, wind direction, and wind speed during the storm. This section 
does have a margin of error since foundered vessels do not have first-hand accounts of when they 
were lost to the storm. The maps show multiple orientations despite an almost constant north or 
northwest wind. The following chapter will take vessel orientation post storm and plot 
orientations and wind direction into SPSS to see if there is any correlation or statistical 
significance between the resting place of the vessels and the storm that wrecked them.
CHAPTER 5: ANALYZING SHIPWRECKS, WIND DIRECTIONS, AND CONFOUNDERS 
This chapter looks at shipwreck orientation in conjunction with wind direction to see if 
there is statistical significance between the two variables. The analysis relies on Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to make the analysis. Previous chapters looked at the 
November, 1913, storm’s movement, the orientation of the vessels, and confounders that may 
nullify the analysis. This chapter will look at SPSS in a variety of ways, including various factors 
that may explain why a vessel wrecked or stranded in a particular direction. The Great Storm of 
1913 has been retrospectively analyzed 100 years after its occurrence by NOAA and this thesis 
to better understand the story behind the vessels and lives lost during the storm. Other 
historically significant storms in the Great Lakes have not been analyzed to this same degree. 
This chapter will focus on how SPSS is used, define key terms used in statistical processing, and 
the data collected using SPSS in conjunction with vessel and wind direction. 
USING SPSS 
SPSS is a computer software program that allows for complex statistical analyses with a 
fairly basic understanding of the program without the complex calculations. This program, 
though simple to use, does demand that users are familiar with conceptual statistics. Data needs 
to be set up correctly as the program will not compensate for incorrect or sloppy data entry. 
SPSS is a comprehensive program that gives more information than is generally needed in the 
output screen. This means that SPSS users need to be familiar with the program as well as the 
information they mean to acquire, and not get lost in the statistical results pages. 
This thesis will decide whether there is statistical significance in shipwreck bow 
orientation combined with knowledge of the storm events, specifically wind direction during the 
wrecking event. Statistical significance means that the results of data are not likely to occur 
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randomly. Finding statistical significance means that there is a relationship between variables. 
Statistical significance can be strong or weak depending on how significant the relationship is as 
well as the sample size in a study (StatPac 2014). Sample size is a proportion of a population. 
The larger the sample size, the more likely the study is going to accurately depict a true 
representation of the population as well as find significant statistics (StatPac 2014). If analysis 
shows that data is statistically significant, then the null hypothesis may be rejected, meaning 
there is not just random relationship variations within a dataset. 
There will be two different datasets; one specifically looking at the orientation of the 
vessels in conjunction with the wind direction, the other dataset looking at what side of each lake 
the vessels are aligned with wind direction. Eleven vessels sank off the immediate lakeshore 
during the storm, seven of which have known locations. Foundered vessels with unknown 
locations include: James Carruthers, Hydrus, Plymouth, and Leafield. Louisiana was stranded 
and caught fire before becoming permanently part of Washington Harbor. H. M. Hanna Jr., L. C. 
Waldo, and Halstead were stranded and prior to being refloated, their positions were recorded 
either through historical photographs or through oral accounts of the storm event. These vessels 
are also included in the orientation dataset analysis.  
 Having a small sample size does not make the study irrelevant, though it does drop the 
amount of confidence researchers may have in the results. There are a few terms that directly 
relate to one another. These terms include: margin of error, confidence level, population size, 
sample size, cross-tabulation, and chi-square. Population size is the total amount of subjects that 
researchers are interested in studying. In the case of the Great Storm of 1913, population size 
varies depending on what researchers’ interests are. If researchers are interested in all vessels 
affected, then the population size would be 39; if researchers are interested in vessels 
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permanently affected by the storm that have not moved since their wrecking event, then the 
population size would be 12 vessels. Since population size may be impossible to survey due to 
missing information, sample size is used in statistics. Sample size is the amount of subjects 
surveyed (Raosoft 2004). Four vessels from the November, 1913, storm have not been found. 
These vessels cannot be used in the Macro Map or the Orientation Map. The vessels whose 
location are known and orientations are known, combined, are the sample size. Sample size 
differs depending on the dataset in this thesis. The Macro Map has a sample size of 35, whereas 
the Orientation Map has a sample size of eight and 11 depending on the study.  
Margin of error is, “the amount of error that you can tolerate. If 90% of respondents 
answer yes, while 10% answer no, you may be able to tolerate a larger amount of error than if 
the respondents are split 50-50 or 45-55. Lower margin of error requires a larger sample size.” 
The Macro Map includes the locations of 35 of the 39 vessels known to have been affected by 
the Great Storm of 1913. Having 35 of 39 vessels leaves this study with a 6% margin of error. 
The Orientation Map has eight of the 10 vessels permanently affected by the storm, which gives 
the study a margin of error of 17%. The Orientation Map that includes all known vessel 
orientations out of the vessels affected on the map is 11 out of the 39 vessels. This leaves 
researchers with a margin of error of 26% (Raosoft 2004). The Orientation Maps have a large 
margin of errors. While this is not ideal, it does not make the study useless, but does call for 
larger amounts of storm and wrecked vessel data in future research. 
 Confidence level is, “the amount of uncertainty you can tolerate.” The higher amount of 
confidence a researcher desires, the higher the sample size needed. Confidence levels for this 
study stayed at 95%. Confidence levels and margin of error are directly related to one another. If 
confidence level diminishes, so does the percentage of margin of error. For example, for the 
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Macro Map, if the sample size stays the same as the above explanation, but confidence level 
drops to 90%, than the margin of error decreases from 6% to 5% (Raosoft 2004). 
Cross-tabulation is used to test hypotheses. This function allows researchers to test if 
variables are related to one another (White and Korotayev 2004:1). Cross-tabulation was used to 
compare wind direction, orientation, and general location on the lake. A chi-square test is used 
to compare observed data with an expected hypothesis (McLaughlin and Noel 1996). Part of this 
includes understanding what is significant. To be significant in this study, the Pearson’s chi-
square, the P value, must be less than or equal to .05 for the null hypothesis to be void. 
USING SPSS WITH NOVEMBER, 1913, AND 2013 DATA 
 The Great Storm of 1913 is a good beginning candidate to work on the conjunction of 
explanatory models and SPSS because the storm affected more vessels than other catastrophic 
storms on the Great Lakes (Ratigan 1960:109), there is a good record where the vessels were 
(Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:430 –444), and a retrospective weather model has been made 
showing the wind and waves every couple of hours during the storm (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:19 
–39). The following section will go through three datasets; one with the general vessel locations 
on the lake, and the other with the orientation of vessels permanently affected on the lakes, and 
the last with all known vessel orientations known, included stranded and refloated vessels. This 
section will show the data entered as well as the output results of the data in SPSS. The dataset 
will move from large scale of where shipwrecks are to where the orientation of vessels are.  
ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY DATA 
When using cross-tabulation, it behooves the researcher to use a minimum of five 
different factors that may influence the results. This allows the data to speak for itself in the 
sense that it shows if there is a more significant factor that affects, in this case, the orientation of 
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the shipwrecked vessel. Cross-tabs have the potential to show statistical significance. Before 
continuing with the hypothesis of this thesis, it was necessary to see if there were any factors that 
proved to be more significant in affecting the orientation of the vessel than wind direction. 
To do this, a table was set-up to include various factors that may have affected the vessel. 
These factors not only included wind direction, but whether the vessel was light or loaded, the 
length, beam, tonnage, wooden or steel, and sail or steam. These factors were used in the cross-
tabs to see what was the most significant factor affecting bow heading. By creating a cross-tabs 
using various factors at the onset, it would allow this thesis to quickly find the most significant 
factor affecting the bow orientation, which would allow all future cross-tabs to avoid excess data 
that would only confound results. See TABLE 5.1 for multiple factor cross-tab data. 
The above information was processed through cross-tabulation in SPSS.  The results 
were expected, with the wind direction being the strongest link to bow heading. Here are the 
resulting chi-square significances: wind direction, 0.088; light or loaded, 0.817; vessel length, 
0.277; beam, 0.194; tonnage, 0.277; wooden or steel, 0.368; sail or steam, 0.088. The findings 




 TABLE 5.1. Representation of factors that could affect bow heading for shipwrecked vessels. 
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propulsion. From this discovery, it was no longer necessary to continue to input the excess data 
in the following cross-tabs. Despite similar statistical significance, sail or steam will also be 
removed from this dataset because there is only one sail powered vessel in comparison with the 
remaining steam powered vessels with a known bow heading after wrecking. An issue with using 
the sail or steam data, for the time being, is that there is no way of knowing if the steam powered 
vessels lost power mid-storm, which would ultimately render them as effective as a sail powered 
vessel. When a larger dataset is acquired for Great Lakes vessels, sail or steam will be more 
useful. This may particularly become useful if steam powered vessels do not appear to align 
where they should, which may indicate to researchers that a vessel lost power during a 
catastrophic weather event. It was necessary to start with seven factors to match against bow 
heading in case that was a stronger significant factor than initially realized. 
MACRO DATA SET 
This study is simple; it does not include excess variables such as vessel length, beam, 
vessel composite, wave height, whether the anchor was thrown, etc. Despite knowing much of 
this information, the study limits itself to the most easily attainable information which includes 
wind direction, vessel orientation, and overall final resting place in the lakes. The study is simple 
because in the future, the study is interested in helping identify unidentified shipwrecks, so 
excess information is not included. TABLE 5.2 shows what information was inputted in SPSS. 
The following table after the input tables looks at vessel location on the lakes in conjunction with 
wind direction. The SPSS function used was “cross-tabs” found in “descriptive” statistics. Two 





Ship Lake Lost In Vessel Location Wind Direction 
Leafield Superior - North 
Turret Chief Superior Center North 
L. C. Waldo Superior Center North 
Henry B. Smith Superior South North 
Major Superior South North 
Huronic Superior South North 
William Nottingham Superior South North 
A. E. Stewart Superior South North 
J. T. Hutchinson Superior South North 
F. G. Hartwell Superior South North 
Meaford St. Mary’s River North North 
Scottish Hero St. Mary’s River West North 
Plymouth Michigan - Northwest 
Louisiana Michigan North Northwest 
Halstead Michigan North Northwest 
Pontiac Michigan North Northwest 
J. M. Jenks Huron Northeast Northeast 
Arcadian Huron Northwest Northwest 
Isaac M. Scott Huron Northwest Northwest 
Argus Huron Northwest Northwest 
Matoa Huron Northwest Northwest 
H. M. Hanna Jr. Huron Northwest Northwest 
John M. McGean Huron Northwest Northwest 
D. O. Mills Huron Northwest Northwest 
Wexford Huron East Northwest 
James Carruthers Huron - Northwest 
Hydrus Huron - Northwest 
Regina Huron West Northwest 
Northern Queen Huron East Northwest 
Charles S. Price Huron West Northwest 
Matthew Andrews Huron West Northwest 
Lightship 61 Huron South Northwest 
H. B. Hawgood Huron South Northwest 
Saxona St. Clair North Northwest 
W. G. Pollock St. Clair Center Northwest 
Victory St. Clair South Northwest 
Robert Fulton Erie Northwest Northwest 
G. J. Grammer Erie Southwest Northwest 
Lightship 82 Erie Northeast Southwest 
TABLE 5.2. Information inputted in SPSS Macro study. “-” designates unknown vessel location 
(Marine Review Vol. 44 1915:43 –44; Wagenmaker et al. 2013:16 –27). 
 
TABLE 5.2 shows the name of the vessel, what lake the vessel foundered or was stranded 
in, which way the wind was blowing at the time of each wrecking, as well as where each vessel’s 
general location was in proximity to the lake it wrecked in. SPSS headings were converted to 
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numbers, north = 1, northeast =2, east =3, southeast =4, south =5, southwest =6, west =7, 
northwest =8, and center of lake was =9. They were converted so SPSS could compute. 
TABLE 5.3. Shows cross-tabs for Macro Map, cross-tabs of wind direction and the side of the 
lake where the vessel was lost. 
 TABLE 5.3 shows in what part of the lake the vessel wrecked in comparison with the 
wind direction. One interesting aspect of the table, in terms of expected results, is that 100% of 
the vessels that sunk in the northwest part of their respective lake were also affected by 
northwest winds. The table shows that 10 of the vessels that sank in the northwest corner of their 
respective lakes were dealing with northwest winds during the storm. Clearly there are patterns; 




TABLE 5.4. This is a chi-square test table, it shows the null hypothesis to be void because the 
Pearson chi-square value is below .05. 
 
 TABLE 5.4 shows the Pearson’s chi-square test. The value is less than .05. The value is 
not 0.0. The number lays outside three decimal places, which is why it shows up as .000 in the 
table. The hypothesis was that general vessel locations on the lakes would be dependent on wind 
direction during the storm. This Macro Map significance test was done first in order to work 
through SPSS while using values that are expected to reject the null hypothesis. The ocean easily 
has waves larger than the Great Lakes (Geology.com 2015), however, the Great Lakes offer a 
different type of peril: running out of navigable sea room. Ships in the Great Lakes cannot outrun 
or outmaneuver a storm as easily as ocean captains because there is not enough room to get out 
of the reach of a powerful storm, especially if the storm’s center is in the middle of one of the 
Great Lakes (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:16 –33). The hypothesis was that vessels were more likely 
to founder or become stranded in accordance with the direction of the wind. The Pearson’s chi-
square test shows the hypothesis to be statistically significant meaning vessels on the Great 
Lakes, during the Great Storm of 1913, were more likely to wreck in the part of the lake from 
which the wind was blowing. This, at first, may seem counter intuitive and may reflect a variable 
imposed by steam power. Upon further thought, it is recognized that vessels with steam power 
would push into the storm, which would allow them the greatest chance of surviving the storm. 
The data, accordingly, makes sense. 
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ORIENTATION DATA SET 
 The second data set looks at vessels permanently lost to the November, 1913 storm. The 
difference between this data set and the data set analyzed above is that in order to qualify to be 
part of the this dataset, the vessels must still be resting in the Great Lakes. The data set is also 
different because rather than looking at the general location in the Great Lakes, the data set looks 
at the bow heading in conjunction with the way the wind direction was at the time of the 
foundering event. The table below shows the information entered in SPSS. There are eight 
vessels that have known bow headings out of the 12 vessels that have been permanently affected. 
There are four vessels that have still not been found from the November, 1913 storm event. 
Vessel Lake Bow Heading Wind Direction 
Louisiana Michigan South Northwest 
Henry B. Smith Superior North North 
Charles S. Price Huron South Northwest 
Regina Huron Northwest Northwest 
Wexford Huron Southeast Northwest 
John A. McGean Huron Northwest Northwest 
Argus Huron Northwest Northwest 
Isaac M. Scott Huron South Northwest 
TABLE 5.5. Data set for shipwreck orientation data. 
 
 TABLE 5.5 was the input information used in the same manner as the Macro Map data 
set. The data was processed using cross-tabulation in order to determine if the Pearson’s chi-
square relationship was statistically significant. Before even beginning to use the input data to 
discover potential correlations, recognize that the sample size is only eight vessels. There are not 
enough data to decide whether there is true value in the output data unless the sample size is at 
least 20 vessels (Parkerson 2015, elec. comm.). The data being inputted is still of value as it is a 
stepping point for future studies if there seems to be some significance.  
TABLE 5.6 looks at cross-tabulation for wind direction and foundered vessel orientation. 
There are only eight vessels whose bow orientation is known which makes this present more as a 
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series of case studies rather than as an aid to an explanatory model for understanding whether 
vessels on the Great Lakes’ permanent orientation is affected by the storm that wrecked them. 
 
TABLE 5.6. Shows cross-tabs for wind direction and vessel orientation. 
 
TABLE 5.6 finds three vessels that have bow orientations that face south during 
northwest winds, three vessels point northwest in northwest winds, one vessel points southeast, 
and one vessel points north in north winds. TABLE 5.7 indicates whether the output data is 




TABLE 5.7. This is a chi-square test table. It rejects the null hypothesis because the Pearson chi-
square value is below .05, though because of the small sample size, this study calls for more data 
before concluding if it is possible to create an explanatory model of the storm. 
 
 TABLE 5.7 shows the Pearson’s chi-square test at a value of 0.046. As decided earlier for 
this study, anything less than 0.05 is considered statistically significant and may prove the null 
hypothesis void. While the study may show there is significant data with bow headings 
correlating with wind direction, in the end, there is not enough data to statistically prove this 
significant. The following data adds three more vessels to the study, all of which were stranded 
and later refloated. They are added to show how much the Pearson’s chi-square test changes with 
just three more data points. 
 
TABLE 5.8. This is a chi-square test table. It shows the null hypothesis to be true because the 
Pearson chi-square value is above 0.05. Thus, there is no relationship. 
  
 TABLE 5.8 looks at the changing Pearson’s chi-square value when three more vessel 
orientations are added to the data set. These vessel’s orientation to shore is known because of 
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historical photographs and because of oral retellings of a stranding event from a member of a 
crew that survived. These vessels are still relevant because the stranding event took place 
because of the Great Storm of 1913. This is important to recognize because the bow heading in 
the middle data set may have changed in the past 100 years, even if only slightly. The Pearson’s 
chi-square value changes to 0.088; this value is no longer statistically significant. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 This study began in an attempt to create an explanatory model for the Great Storm of 
1913. Its hypothesis was that bow direction relates to with wind direction during a wrecking 
event for steam powered vessels. In the process of getting data ready for this study, a new map 
was created for the November, 1913 storm. This map corrects many of the locations for the 
vessels foundered or stranded during the storm event. The updated map was used to create the 
first data set. The hypothesis was that wrecked vessel location within an inland lake directly 
relates to the wind direction that occurred during the wrecking event. Running the cross-tabs as 
well as the Pearson’s chi-square test found that hypothesis to be true. Vessels were more likely to 
become foundered or stranded in the part of the lake that the wind was blowing from, suggesting 
that captains steam head on into the wind in their best efforts to stay afloat. Being under sail or 
losing power mid-storm can prove to be disastrous if the gunnels or stern takes the brunt of the 
waves rather than the bow. This hypothesis was tested to fully understand the capabilities of 
SPSS; within the parameters of this study, this hypothesis proved true. 
 The second data set looked at bow heading in conjunction with wind direction to see if 
bow direction either directly or inversely related to wind direction, mimicking it like a vector 
line. This question was asked to have researchers in the Great Lakes try to focus on creating 
broader regional studies (O’Shea 2002:211). Pearson’s chi-square test showed the data to be 
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statistically significant. When the additional three stranded vessels were added to the study, the 
Pearson’ chi-square test was no longer significant, though the finding is suggestive.  
 Despite the Great Storm of 1913 being one of the largest storms to hit the Great Lakes as 
well as being the storm to affect the most vessels on the lakes in a four day period, there is not 
enough information from this event to conclusively determine whether bow heading correlates 
with wind direction during the time of wrecking, however, this does suggest that steamers 
headed into the wind before being overwhelmed (Marine Review Vol. 44 1915:41). 
 This study did create a new map for the storm, which includes the correct location of 
vessels affected by the storm for stranding and foundering events. This thesis also created a bow 
orientation map for the vessels that are still in the Great Lakes. 
WAVES AND VARIABLES 
 The data above may leave readers wondering what factors may influence a vessel outside 
of powerful wind systems. There are multiple possible confounders that may influence a vessel’s 
wrecking location more than the extreme wind that caused its wrecking. The biggest variable, 
outside wind direction, appears to be whether a vessel is powered or under sail. As helpless as a 
crew may feel, the people on board a wrecking vessel have power to influence how it wrecks 
(Marine Review Vol. 43 1914:443). Crews and captains may opt to steam head into the wind, 
drop both anchors, one, or none. A crew and captain can try to reposition their vessel into a 
storm, or they may find the best option to be running aground as soon as possible to avoid 
capsizing in the middle of the lake during the storm. People have tremendous influence over the 
vessels they are on board, especially if the wrecking event is more than a couple hours long. The 
theories and ideas behind this thought were described in Chapter 3, “Grounding Weather, 
Vessels, and Humanity in Theory.” 
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 Another variable that has the potential to drastically affect a vessel’s foundering or 
wrecking event is wave action. The Great Storm of 1913 had sustained winds of over 70 mph 
and gusts reaching 90 mph. Waves continue to increase as they receive net energy, which can be 
from the force of wind on the upwind face of waves, or from the frictional drag of air moving 
over water (Lane 2015). Waves and wind do not always move in the same direction; this is 
particularly noticeable close to shore, where waves are seen to go into shore, which may be a 
different direction than the wind. For much of the storm, the wind appeared to blow north-
northwest (Wagenmaker et al. 2013:16 –42). When looking at the map with the general positions 
of shipwrecks of the Great Storm of 1913, it appears that many ships were stranded or foundered 
on the western side of Lake Huron. There also appears to be a proportionally high amount of 
wrecks in Lake Huron’s southern pocket as well as Lake Superior’s southern pocket. Wave 
height and wave direction were given in the retrospective model, however, that model only 
showed wave height, not wave direction. There are rogue waves in the Great Lakes; these have 
the potential to spawn a wrecking event, especially because the Great Lakes are unique in often 
creating three rogue waves at once, the three sisters. Since rogue waves and wave direction was 
unknown, they were not added to the measured variables in this study, though this variable most 
likely had a large influence on vessels during the storm since large waves could break vessels 
(Ken Merryman 2015, elec. comm.). 
 Another factor to consider is the depth at which a shipwreck rests. The deeper the wreck, 
the more a vessel may have been influenced by the water column while sinking, which may 
manipulate the direction the bow faces. It is unlikely that vessels such as Henry B. Smith, which 
rests below 500 feet from the surface, was able to sink in a perfect uniform manner from the 
initial wrecking process (Ken Merryman 2015, elec. comm.). These factors will be considered 
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more thoroughly once a larger data set has been compiled to account for significant variations 
between wrecks. 
 The largest confounders of this thesis are the Great Lakes themselves. The Great Storm 
of 1913 proved to be one of the most disastrous storms to ever cross the Great Lakes, however, 
the Great Lakes Basin is not a stranger to bad weather. Regular storm activity may consist of 
thousands of similar storms that have similar patterns, which incorporate wind direction, 
currents, and debris drift (Wayne Lusardi 2015, elec. comm.). The consistency of storms across 
the Great Lakes may confuse researchers when looking to relate a wreck to a particular storm. 
Known shipwrecks related to known storms must be compiled to understand the minor 
inconsistencies between large storm events, such as the shipwrecks explored within this thesis. 
Once large storms and their associated wrecks are examined, it may be possible to find the 
differences between large weather events and the overall regular storm activity of the Great 
Lakes. 
 Chapter 5 looked at the Great Storm of 1913’s shipwrecks to assess their bow orientation 
in conjunction with variables that might be associated with bow direction to find the most 
statistically significant variable. Wind direction proved to be the most statistically significant 
factor when understanding shipwreck placement on the Great Lakes in a macro scale as well as 
bow orientation. Besides using SPSS to analyze the results, this chapter looked at variables that 
have the potential to confuse the analysis process. Despite the significance of these confounders 
in this thesis, these confounders excite the possibility of new avenues of research in broader 
Great Lakes and shipwreck research, as all these variables, when studied in depth, may offer 
more insight into the wrecking processes in the sweetwater seas.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis looks at the Great Storm of 1913; it created an updated map with all 39 
commercial vessels affected by the Great Storm of 1913 as well as a map depicting the various 
orientations of 11 vessels affected by the storm. Eight of these vessels still reside in either Lake 
Superior, Lake Michigan, or Lake Huron. The study attempted to create an explanatory model 
for vessels wrecked by catastrophic disaster on the Great Lakes, but found that the Great Storm 
of 1913 did not have enough archaeologically documented vessels to create an adequate data set 
to determine whether their bow heading orientation is statistically significant, in terms of wind 
direction, to cause the wrecking. 
 This thesis urges Great Lakes shipwreck archaeologists to begin compiling data on 
vessels wrecked, wind direction, and bow heading. Large enough data sets need to be created to 
determine whether explanatory models can be made and if predictive models may be created for 
the future of shipwreck archaeology to help determine unidentified shipwrecks that appear to 
have foundered. Burn and collision victims are out of this model. Data sets should be broken into 
10 year wrecking categories to account for potentially drastic non-cultural transformation 
processes. Once more data is compiled, studies may be broken down in more specific ways, such 
as combining variables like wind direction, bow heading, and whether a vessel was steam or sail 
powered to create a more comprehensive study. Future studies may also divide the Lakes into 
different studies; the fetch of each Lake differs and may create confounders that impede a 
combined study of all the inland Lakes.  
LIMITATIONS 
There are an array of factors that influence the wrecking patterns on the Lakes and have 
the potential to limit the possibilities of future explanatory and predictive models. The Great 
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Lakes are confined waters and therefore, the water may move in multiple directions. During a 
storm, the water on the surface may move in a complete opposite way as water 20 feet from the 
surface. Despite calm waters on the surface, water currents below the surface may still run strong 
hours after a storm. There are a variety of additional factors that may be impossible for SPSS to 
account for in terms of statistical significance because all factors have the potential to contribute 
to the final wrecking process. These factors may include: intended and final course of the vessel, 
crew’s reactions and decisions, depth of water, density of vessel upon sinking, and loss of 
steerage or power. Once a grander scale of research has been conducted, researchers must also 
account for various mean Lake levels and compare them to different storm data. Mean Lake level 
can affect wave action, ice shove, sediment deposition, erosion rates, and the distance to the 
shore (Wayne Lusardi 2015, elec. comm.). These factors can play into the resting place for a 
vessel and may change a vessel’s orientation over time if the change is drastic enough. These 
factors were not included in this thesis because the goal of this thesis was to create an 
explanatory model rather than a predictive model. In the future, if a predictive model is possible, 
these factors must be included and assessed when possible. 
Other factors that may be accounted for is the placement of seaways. The entrance of St. 
Mary’s River as well as the St. Clairs River are overwhelmed with shipwrecks, despite the 
wrecks not correlating with the general trend of steaming into the storm. This difference could 
simply stem from the rivers being a more protected environment, which made immediately 
adjusting to the open Lake an impossible task mid-storm. Once there is more data, these 






 This thesis updated the current popular map depicting vessels stranded and foundered 
during the 1913 storm and it calls for more regional collaboration in the inland seas to create a 
broader understanding of ships foundered by catastrophic storm events. 
 The research found a pattern in sustained wind direction during a storm and the final 
resting place of vessels in conjunction with their location in the Lakes. This study used SPSS to 
find suggestive statistics that may show why a vessel’s bow orientation may rest in a particular 
way, however, this study more importantly found the factors that may influence the final 
positioning of a vessel. If a predictive model is to be created, a compilation of research is needed 
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